Realism and idealism in the harmonization of contract law in the European Union by Gaskell, Jeremy M.
  
REALISM AND IDEALISM IN THE HARMONIZATION OF 
CONTRACT LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Jeremy Mark Gaskell 
 
For the Degree of LLM by Research 
 
University of East Anglia 
 
December 2012 
 
 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is 
under- stood to recognize that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any 
information derived therefrom must be in accordance with current UK copyright Law. 
In addition any quotation or extract must include full attribution. 
 
 
i 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction and Outline of Subject      1 
Chapter 1         6  
The PECL and the Draft Common frame of Reference     
        
 From Principles to ‘toolbox’     17  
   
 Draft Common Frame of Reference and codification 22 
 
 The Advent of European legal concepts   26 
 
 
Chapter 2         27 
 
Novum Ius Commune Europaeum      
 
 12
th
 Century renaissance     29 
 
 Fragmentation and defragmentation     31 
 
 Impact of Protestant Reformation    35 
 
 The role and influence of Helmut Coing   37 
 
 The case of Sweden      40 
 
 Coing and Savigny      41 
 
 Legal and jurisprudential affinities    45 
 
Chapter 3        53 
 
Professor Legrand’s Seminal Paper      
 
 Values, presuppositions and outlook    55 
 
 Codification and pragmatism     58 
 
 Enlightenment Era of Codification    59 
 
 Developments in Germany in 19
th
 Century   64 
 
 Legrand’s inferences regarding Convergence  65 
ii 
 
 
 Coke, the English mentalité:and Legrand’s use of Culture    68 
                     
 
 Oblique criticism      73 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Good Faith and Jurisprudence     75 
 
 Lord Mansfield’s treatment of Good Faith   77 
 
 Fourteenth century developments    80 
 
 Unreasonable and unconscionable    81 
 
 19
th
 Century perspectives     83 
 
 Voluntarism and Utilitarianism     84 
 
 Contemporary influence of Civil Law   87 
 
 The moral context of freedom of contract   89 
 
 Good Faith as a catalyst for harmonization   92 
 
 Reticence and fraud      95 
 
 Reaching a consensus      96 
  
 
Chapter 5        98 
 
The Evolution of Thought Within the Commission    
 
 International conventions      101 
 
 Political considerations of the Commission   103 
 
 The New Poverty      104 
 
 Consumer Protection today     105 
 
 Consumer Protection and the Draft Common frame of  
             Reference       106 
 
 The legal position under the treaties     108 
 
iii 
 
 The Court of Justice’s role     108 
 
 Impact of Tobacco Advertising case judgments  109 
 
 Conventions on contractual and Non-contractual 
            Obligations       109 
 
 Supplanting the Draft Common frame of Reference  112 
 
 The Common European Sales Law    114 
 
 The duty of disclosure to the Consumer   117 
 
Concluding Remarks       121 
 
 Risk of legal nationalism     124 
 
 Conflict Resolution through Education   127 
 
References         131 
iv 
 
Abstract 
The advantages of enhanced cross-border trade among the member states 
are emphasized by advocates of the harmonization of law in the European 
Union, a principle which has been included in each of the treaties of 
accession.  Following political events in 1989, the concept of a Europe-
wide law of obligations received renewed impetus. The leading advocates, 
who comprised a Study Group under the chairmanship of Professor 
Christian von Bar, were academic lawyers supported by the European 
Commission and by journals devoted to legal integration. The impact of 
decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2000 and 2006, 
however, ensured that only a modest proposal, as distinct from a European 
Civil Code, would be put forward.  
The Common European Sales Law, an optional instrument, is 
assessed both in terms of how it is expected to work and in the light of 
benefits arising from the existence of standard European terms. Also in this 
thesis historical-legal arguments in favour of ‘Europeanized’ contract law 
are evaluated and found to be not wholly convincing. The counter-
argument, put forward by the Canadian Professor Pierre Legrand, 
maintains that the principal European legal traditions are epistemologically 
distinct, rendering convergence impossible. Legrand’s contribution to the 
debate is possibly overstated but has never been shown to be misconceived. 
However, this thesis draws attention to the degree of affinity – greater than 
is generally recognized – which always existed between the Common and 
Civil Law traditions. It is argued that this underlying affinity is more likely 
to lead to durable results by European lawyers seeking solutions to shared 
problems than by the artificial process of codification. 
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INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF THE SUBJECT 
 
A persuasive argument can be made that in countries of the Western legal 
tradition there is a tendency for law and legal standards to converge “as the 
problems faced by courts and legislators acquire a common and 
international flavour” (Markesinis 1994, p.30). In point of fact the trend 
was recognised by Holdsworth (1935, p.vi) who remarked that through the 
impact of modern science the world had been diminished in size, 
civilization had become standardized and the social and economic 
problems faced by modern states had become increasingly similar. The 
consequence was that “a consideration of the different legal solutions 
which each nation has made of these problems is more necessary than it 
was in the past”. In addition to the impact of global trends there is another 
argument, perhaps complementary, to the effect that law should be 
harmonized as a matter of policy and not left to chance. The economic 
dividend from the increased volumes of trade that would result is the most 
commonly urged justification for such a policy today. In the aftermath of 
the First World War, however, the principal motivation was to render the 
prospect of another European conflict less likely.  
 
The Unidroit movement established in the 1920s was the progenitor of the 
two Hague Conventions which in turn became the basis for the Convention 
on the International Sale of Goods (CISG). This last took effect among 
signatory states in 1988. Although the CISG is regarded as a success, its 
terms are regarded as prone to interpretation according to the different 
national law background of legal practitioners (McKendrick 2006, p.7). 
Since 1988 much work has been done on the preparation of a number of 
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legal instruments in the service of the harmonization of Contract Law. The 
Principles of European Contract Law (1995 et seq.) achieved much by way 
of restoring the reputation of Comparative Law following its eclipse during 
the Cold War, before themselves being superseded by the Draft Frame of 
Common Reference and in October 2011 by the Proposal for a Common 
European Sales Law. The history of these changes, which also addresses 
some of the policy considerations that had a bearing on why the progress of 
harmonization has been only gradual, forms the substance of the first 
chapter. 
 
During the long gestation period of the Hague Conventions the Treaty of 
Rome was drafted. Article 2  -  since replaced by Art 114 of the Lisbon 
Treaty (TFEU)  -  provided for the ‘approximation’ of national laws among 
the Member States of the European Communities. The revolutionary nature 
and purpose of what was proposed  -  ‘a united European state’ -  was 
succinctly summarized by Cornwell (1969, p.91).  The immediate aims 
were to prevent the occurrence of wars by ending national sovereignty and 
to bring about reconciliation between France and Germany. In these aims 
conspicuous success may be claimed but the “creation of a third force in 
the world [which] would counter balance the strength of the United States 
and Russia” and the “full use” that could be made of “the economic and 
military resources of Europe by organizing them on a continental rather 
than a national scale” (ibid.) have proved difficult to realize. Except for a 
period in the 1950s (Eden 1960, p.30ff.) the United States has not since 
1945 been willing to countenance the growth of Europe as a front rank 
military power. This notwithstanding, the goals set by the Treaty of 
Accession could only be achieved if the European entity reached the status 
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of an economic superpower. Since one of the reasons for the wealth 
creating capacity of the United States is the size and sophistication of its 
internal market, it was urged that everything had to be done to encourage a 
similar degree of economic activity across national borders within Europe. 
The inclusion of the principle of the approximation of law in the second 
article of the Treaty of Rome is best understood in this context. There may 
have been a number of factors, including the existence of a protective tariff 
wall, behind the statistics that show that from 1958-63 the total value of 
trade within the original six Member States increased by 130% (Cornwell 
op. cit., p.96). 
 
The recognition that legal systems are of the essence of nationhood may 
have been a secondary consideration on the part of those who prioritized 
the approximation of laws when the treaties establishing the communities 
were being drafted. As mentioned, except for the notable work of a small 
number of academic writers, principally in West Germany, the policy of 
encouraging approximation remained practically dormant from the 1950s-
1980s. As late as 1990 Markesinis added the phrase ‘a subject in search of 
an audience’ as a subtitle to a paper on Comparative Law1. The policy of 
leaving the constituent nations with their respective legal systems, which 
had been adopted in 1707 by Great Britain when it became the first modern 
federal state in Western Europe, was not followed because it conflicted 
with the economic and political aims of Europe’s founders as adumbrated 
above. Instead there was a quest to establish a basis for the harmonization 
of law which was based on something more edifying than simple economic 
or geo-political considerations.  It is undeniable that the ancient Ius 
                                                 
1
 ‘Comparative Law  -  A Subject in Search of an Audience’ Modern Law Review 53 (1) pp.1-21 
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commune has been idealized as a species of Roman Law which remained in 
force over most of Continental Europe until the dawning of national 
particularism in the revolutionary era of the late 18
th
 Century.  If this seems 
a simplistic reading of an historical phenomenon of some complexity, it is 
nevertheless characteristic of the treatment accorded to the concept of the 
Ius commune in the context of German Rechtwissenschaft (literally ‘legal 
scholarship’), particularly by those influenced by Helmut Coing (1912 – 
2000) and his sympathisers. Whether the use to which the Ius commune has 
been put by a succession of academic writers should be described as 
historical or propagandistic is a question which is treated in depth in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis, since whether the Ius commune can bear the 
interpretation often placed upon it is a matter which has not received due 
consideration. Moreover, the note of historical determinism that is evident 
whenever there is discussion of a novum Ius commune Europaeum will be 
shown to be questionable. 
 
A related purpose of this thesis is to address the manner in which history 
has been used by European legal scholars to serve the contemporary goal of 
achieving a ‘re-Europeanized’ legal Weltanschaaung.  The prevailing 
assumptions regarding the basis for any such ‘outlook’ or mentalité, 
together with widely held belief in the convergence of the national law of 
European states, were questioned by Legrand (1996) in a paper which 
challenged the complacency of those who imagined that a codified 
European Law of Obligations would become a reality by 2010. In Chapter 
3 an assessment is made of Legrand’s contribution  -  undoubtedly erudite  
-  to the debate since he is widely regarded by legal integrationists as 
having overstated his case. The grounds for Legrand’s controversial claim 
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that differing legal systems, and the habits of thought that they reflect, are 
inherently centrifugal  -  thus tending to diverge rather than converge  -  are 
questioned since they appear founded on assumptions quite as much as the 
arguments of his detractors. Even if it is true, as Legrand asserts, that the 
different traditions are separated by ‘an epistemological chasm’,  clearly 
European legal systems are “sufficiently cognate to one another to make 
comparison profitable” (Holdsworth op. cit., p.v).  No-one can be in any 
doubt where Legrand stands in the debate over whether convergence is 
desirable. He argues that attempts to distil Comparative Law into a science 
detached from any historical and even political context run the risk of 
ignoring the fact that mentalité varies significantly from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. Whether ‘the chasm’ is as profound, or so wide as to be 
unbridgeable, is perhaps open to question. Moreover, since the term 
mentalité has different shades of meaning, the establishment of a European 
‘outlook’ might be achievable in one area of law, for instance Consumer 
Protection, but not in another.  
 
Because of the priority given to Consumer Protection by the Commission, 
the ‘legal irritant’ represented by the principle of ‘good faith and fair 
dealing’ was first intruded into the English legal system by means of the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts regulations in 1993. Whether this 
principle will enhance the approximation of law and legal thought in 
Europe or whether it will simply undermine well established judicial 
precedent in England is discussed in Chapter 4. At the same time a critique 
is made of claims that have been made for this principle regarding its 
6 
 
suitability as a catalyst for bringing about the harmonization of contract 
law
2
. 
 
Three factors are considered in the final chapter:  the evolution of the 
policy of the European Commission over the years, the impact of a series 
of judgments by the Court of Justice on the Commission’s thinking, and, 
lastly, whether the Common European Sales Law can be seen as an 
optional instrument capable of realizing the original aims of the European 
Union’s founders. Accordingly the discussion of certain legal instruments 
in Chapter 1 is complemented by the discussion of the Common European 
Sales Law in Chapter 5. The intervening chapters should shed light on 
those matters of policy that are occasionally alluded to obliquely, but 
seldom enunciated succinctly, either by the European Commission or by its 
servants who are responsible for them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 See Zimmermann, R. and Whittaker, S. J. (2000) Good Faith in European Contract Law Cambridge: CUP 
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Chapter One 
 
The PECL and the Draft Common Frame of Reference 
The economic and political factors that have been the principal drivers of 
European integration since the inception of the European Communities 
were given renewed impetus by the historic changes in Europe in 1989 
which heralded the rapid expansion of the European Union. The 
functioning of the internal market, as prescribed by Article 26 of the Treaty 
for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), forms the context, in 
this the most recent consolidation of the treaty of accession, for a fully 
harmonized law of obligations including the development of a European 
law of contract. The arguments consistently advocated by the European 
Commission for the harmonization of the private law of the Member States 
are primarily concerned with augmenting the volume of cross-border 
commerce and, increasingly, with strengthening and deepening the benefits 
that thereby accrue to the consumer (Reding 2012, para.15). Advocates of 
closer European integration characterize differences in contract law as one 
of the most significant ‘non-tariff barriers’ to greater economic activity.   
 
The creation of a fully functioning internal European market was one of the 
economic and political considerations that led to the adoption within 
Europe of a robust policy on integration in the late 1980s. As discussed 
below such considerations were not new and had been at the forefront of 
the minds of those who laid the foundations of the European Communities. 
Integrationists have always argued that a uniform private law is an essential 
precondition to an internal market and that, even if not specifically alluded 
to in the Single European Act 1986, its development was logically implied 
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by that measure, and by corresponding legislation and regulations 
subsequently. Continental jurists who favour greater integration, notably 
those from the Low Countries and Germany, see nothing new in such a 
departure. At times this leads to an over-simplification of the arguments.  
For instance, in Belgium the propositions of those in favour of faster 
progress to closer integration  -  the so-called Européenistes  -  have been 
ranged against those of their counterparts, the Euroskeptiques (a term with 
a different connotation to that in a British context), by van Hoecke (2004, 
p.1). Ironically such a division serves to give credence to those who 
interpret the advocacy of the harmonization of contract law in the European 
Union as an aspect of an essentially political  -  in the sense of politically 
driven  -   agenda. Employing an historical analogy, Smits (1998, p.328) 
claimed that the purely economic motive for the unification of private law 
is 
usually exemplified by the situations in Italy and Germany in 1866 and 1900 
respectively; in these countries, unification of the law came about after political 
and economic integration.  
 
Legal Scholarship   
To these economic and political considerations Smits added a third: “It is 
also challenging academically to achieve a uniform private law which is 
capable of removing the alleged contradistinctions between Civil law and 
Common Law” (ibid, p.328).  If, as seems to be implied here by Smits, 
European comparative lawyers habitually view all “European” questions 
through the prism of national experience and history, it is important for 
legal scholars to have broad horizons and more than a superficial 
knowledge of legal history. It is regrettable that for most European 
students, as well as for many teachers and practitioners of law there exists 
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little more than a vague awareness of the precepts of European legal 
systems other than their own.  This is notwithstanding the existence of 
notable figures in the field of comparative law such as Helmut Coing, 
1912-2000, who encouraged a European legal scholarship ‘oriented round 
legal problems rather than national rules’3.  
 
The establishment of a European ‘legal scholarship’, an expression which 
is apt to vary in meaning according to the prevailing legal culture, contains 
an implicit recognition of the general truth that different political entities 
receive their distinctive characteristics, at least in part, by virtue of the 
nature of their legal systems. Well before the controversy initiated by 
Legrand (1996), discussed in Chapter 3 below, the point was made by 
Fletcher (1982, p.10). He advocated closer harmonization within the 
context of ‘legal scholarship’ but was wary of those whose motivation was 
primarily political. A perceptive writer, Fletcher accurately predicted the 
rise of regional legal nationalism as a response to the dominant legal 
culture in Europe. The first Treaties, according to Fletcher, provide for the 
“progressive unification” of the laws of member states “in accordance with 
the integrationist philosophy with which they are imbued”, a process which 
“may be seen as an instrument whereby the larger, ultimate objective of 
European Union is to be achieved” (ibid., p.10).  Fletcher concluded, 
“When eventually the community reaches a stage where it functions as a 
single legal unit, or at least as a federalized legal system, the psychological 
and material foundations for political unity will be well and truly laid” 
                                                 
3
 Coing, H. (1990) ‘Europäisierung der Rechtswissenschaft’ 43 Neue Juristiche Wochenschrift 937, 940 
cited in Gordley, J. (2000-01) ‘Comparative Law and Legal Education‘ 75 (4) Tulane Law Review 1003-
1014, 1005 
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(ibid., p.11).  A blueprint for such unity had been drawn up by an important 
ally of Konrad Adenauer, Walter Hallstein (1962, p.24), who ultimately 
served as President of the Commission:  
The chief motive for what we have called economic integration was always 
political. It was given expression at Paris and Messina and is voiced in the 
preambles to the treaties establishing the Communities;  the subject matter of 
these too, and of the Community’s action, is political … For this reason its 
organization is also political, and modeled on the federal tradition of recent 
history.  
 
Principles of European Contract Law  
In the early years the attitude of the Commission was influenced by the 
language of Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome which was redolent with the 
economic optimism of the post-war era of cheap oil. The Community was 
tasked with ‘progressively approximating the economic policies of member 
states’ leading to ‘an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the 
standard of living, and closer relations between the states belonging to [the 
Community].” While the language of Article 3 of the Treaty of European 
union (TEU) and the corresponding Article 114 of the Treaty for the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) strike a less certain note 
regarding standards of living, it is likely that contemporary Commission 
policy is a continuation of that of those who drafted the early treaties 
pertaining to the European Communities. Article 115 TFEU, ex Article 95 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), provides: 
[T]he Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect 
he establishment or functioning of the internal market. 
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The negative consequences for trade of continuing legal uncertainty in 
cross-border transactions evidently prompted the inclusion of this provision 
for harmonization of laws in the treaty of accession. 
 
Among European policy makers it has long been assumed that more cross 
border commerce would both result from closer approximation of private 
law and lead to an acceleration of the harmonization process. Funding was 
provided by the European Commission in the early 1980s for the twenty 
two members of the Commission on European Contract Law under the 
chairmanship of Professor Lando. Accordingly the Lando commission 
undertook the establishment of principles understood as constituting ‘soft 
law’, the Principles of European Contract Law, often characterized as a 
new Lex mercatoria. In Smits’s opinion (op. cit., p.330), however - 
The precise nature of the Lando principles is not very clear. According to the 
Preamble their purpose is rather modest, but in the majority of the now ample 
literature the Principles are treated as if they were a legal system on an equal 
level with national law developed over centuries which is capable by itself of 
resolving disputes … although any applicable case law, based on the Principles, 
is still lacking. 
Either the Principles were found to be insufficiently robust to bear the 
interpretation thus placed upon them, or it was decided that only a species 
of hard law would lead to the desired level of integration. Arguably the 
Principles were simply overtaken by events, and in the post-1989 world 
they were found to be too narrow in scope, conception and application, 
particularly with regard to the consumer. Smits’s paper, published before 
enthusiasm on the part of the Commission for a European Civil Code had 
begun to decline, included an oblique reference to the possibility of a less 
consensual approach: “I do not shy away from defending the position that 
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in the past few years, perhaps unconsciously, ideas on a European 
codification have taken a u-turn”. By this he meant a deliberate turning 
from ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ law which would take the form of “a binding 
instrument imposed by the competent institutes of the Union.” (op. cit., 
p.330).    
 
The PECLs’ authors themselves had stated their belief that  
general principles applicable across the Union as a whole must be established by 
a more creative process whose purpose is to identify, so far as possible, the 
common core of the contract law of all the Member States (Lando and Beale, 
2000 Intro xxvi; cf. ibid. XXIV footnotes 3 and 6). 
The authors’ stated aim of establishing the ‘common core’ of the European 
legal systems suggests that there are principles that all European legal 
systems hold in common, and that any legal principles that are not held in 
common are not part of the PECL. In reality the position is not so simple. 
Without doubt the principle of good faith and fair dealing, well-developed 
in Civil Law jurisdictions, was eventually included because it would have 
seemed incongruous to omit it from the PECL even though it is not a 
principle that can be said to have been held in common by all the member 
states   -   if one excludes the workings of the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contract Regulations 1993, 1999 in the interests of the European consumer. 
It seems implicit in the reference to a ‘common core’ that a harmonized 
European contract law would be divested of legal traditions not shared by 
all the member states. However, the claim that “[o]ne of the major benefits 
offered by the Principles is to provide a bridge between the civil law and 
the common law by providing rules designed to reconcile their differing 
legal philosophies.” (ibid., Intro p. xxiii) is consistent with the opinion of 
Smits cited above. The authors also stated, somewhat laconically, that one 
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objective of the PECL “is to serve as a basis for any future European code 
of contracts” (ibid., Intro p. xxiii). 
 
A “set of neutral rules” was advocated which was “not based on any one 
national legal system but drawing on the best solutions offered by the laws 
of jurisdictions within (and sometimes outside) Europe” (ibid., Intro p. 
xxiii). As a basis solely for resolving disputes by arbitration after the 
manner described in paragraph 4.a of the Preamble to The Unidroit 
Principles of International Contracts (1994) this selective approach seems 
uncontroversial. However, the authors of the PECL wished to see them 
“applied equally to purely domestic contracts.”(p. xxv) One might almost 
believe that the PECL was an academic exercise intended to have an 
entirely beneficent impact on commercial relationships within the 
European ‘family’ of legal systems if so desired. The reasoning behind the 
European Parliament’s resolution, however, is more overtly political, and 
the tone is one of which Hallstein and successive Presidents of the 
European Commission would have approved: “[U]nification can be carried 
out in branches of private law which are highly important for the 
development of a Single Market, such as contract law.” (European 
Parliament, 1989). In the aftermath of the Single European Act 1986 the 
stress was on ‘unification’ rather than ‘approximation.’ This marked the 
beginning of a decade which augured well for the promulgation of a 
codified system for use throughout the European Union. The reasons for a 
subsequent shift in emphasis away from formal codification early in the 
new century and the consequent modification of the proposals will be 
considered in Chapter 5 below. It is arguable that any discussion of matters 
prior to 2001 is merely historical. However, a close examination of the 
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reasoning and motivation which then pertained is considered important for 
two reasons. Firstly, over the years there has been a notable lack of 
frankness on the part of the Commission regarding its long term plans for 
the future so these have to be inferred from its actions and public 
statements (McKendrick 2006, p.13, cf Vogenauer and Weatherill 2006, 
p.141 et seq. and Ashton 2006, p. 246); secondly, the shift in emphasis 
towards an optional instrument as distinct from an obligatory code was not 
accompanied by widespread resignation on the part of those who had been 
the keenest advocates of the former policy. Accordingly the policy 
espoused a generation or more ago during the formative period of those 
who still wield influence in the European Union, whether as academic 
writers or in a formal capacity, may yet determine the evolution of 
European Private Law for the foreseeable future. 
 
Philosophical background 
Although the words unification and harmonization are sometimes used 
interchangeably, a policy of unification of law in fact may be contrasted 
with the kind of harmonization that might emerge if left to evolve naturally 
through legal education (Lando, 2003, p.123). In the case of European law, 
like national law before it, development would take place in a manner 
consistent with the evolutionary principles espoused by the Historical 
School of the 18
th
 – 19th Centuries. Those who would unify the law of 
obligations in the European Union sometimes refer to the trend towards 
progressive harmonization instituted by the Commission as the 
‘Europeanisation’ of such law (Beale, 1996, p.23). However, as Whittaker 
(2009,p.624) has noted, their antecedents may be found in the 
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‘Enlightenment rationalism applied to the science of law-making’ 
characteristic of the 18
th
 Century. The unifiers are apt to - 
see the piecemeal nature of EC directives as clashing with their own legal 
traditions and creating both formal and substantive difficulties for their national 
laws. The national codifications of civil law swept away the patchwork of 
enactments and accumulated customary laws and replaced them with coherent 
and internally consistent principles and rules. … In common with national 
constitutions the civil codes were political acts:  many reinforced national 
unification and they reflected societal values, even where these values were 
clothed in concepts inherited from the Roman legal tradition.  
 
While few would contradict this analysis it is doubtful whether the process 
Whittaker describes could have been brought to a successful conclusion in 
either France or Germany in the 19
th
 Century in the absence of the exercise 
of imperial authority. It seems at least questionable whether anything 
analogous can be achieved by this means when popular assent, expressed 
through appropriate constitutional mechanisms, is obligatory. Had the 
Commission proceeded on the basis of Qualified Majority Voting to 
impose a European Civil Code the consequences must have been an 
increase in legal nationalism.  Having been educated in a society in which 
Hegelian principles are still paramount, German comparative lawyers who 
espoused the cause of a European Civil Code were in a position to conduct 
an analysis of various propositions which have been put forward 
concerning the closer approximation of European contract law in 
accordance with Hegel’s principle of a propounded thesis being countered 
by its antithesis before ultimately being resolved in a synthesis. Support for 
this contention may be found in the fact that something approaching a 
sublation, in the Hegelian sense, is discernible in the thought of an earlier 
generation advocates of a standardized ‘Obligationsrecht’: the title -  Vom 
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deutschen zur europäischen Recht -  of a collection of papers dedicated to 
Hans Dölle in 1963,  is clear evidence of the thought processes at work 
(Zweigert,1963; Zimmermann 2006, p.547 footnote 24).  
 
Central to the agenda of the integrationists in the last quarter of the 20
th
 
Century was a desire to continue a process, which in the 19th Century 
successfully unified German law by means of a legal scholarship (or legal 
‘science’  -  both are acceptable translations of  the expression 
Rechtswissenscahft)  -  which in its original conception was unashamedly 
derived from the ancient Roman commentators. The concept has no direct 
equivalent in conventional English legal scholarship. Behind it lies a 
weight of classical learning so great as to be characterized by Lord Goff 
(1997, p.748) as an ‘incubus’, particularly for students. One consequence is 
that academic opinion in Germany since the 19
th
 Century has been held in 
such high esteem that German professors of civil law can expect to their 
conclusions not only to inform judicial thinking but also to be taken into 
account by those charged with the formulation of public policy.  
 
By means of ‘legal science’ all of Europe, both Civil Law and Common 
Law jurisdictions, might eventually be brought into conformity. In order to 
understand how this might be so, it will be necessary to examine certain 
presuppositions of modern legal thought from which it may be possible to 
perceive how great a degree of proximity exists between academic writers 
who advocate greater ‘coherence’ in European contract law and those who 
are entrusted with directing the European ‘way forward’ at the political 
level. However, it is submitted that the fostering of a European identity 
among the jurists of Europe should not require the creation of a dichotomy 
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between European and national legal systems in order to bring about the 
‘Reception’ of the one at the expense of the other in a manner analogous to 
what happened at an earlier stage in German history. In 1997 Lord Goff 
extolled the virtues of “the first volume of Professor Christian von Bar’s 
great enterprise to produce a European law of torts … This remarkable 
work, inspired by a romantic reminiscence of the reception (sic) into 
Germany of Roman law, … should educate us all about the possible shape 
which our law of obligations may adopt in the years to come.” (op. cit., 
p.748)  The evidence suggests that beyond the initial creation of a 
‘European legal scholarship’ is the aim of achieving the inception of a 
European legal ‘mentalité’ or, to use Fletcher’s term ‘psychology’(1982, 
p.11), as a precursor to the establishment of a Europe-wide law of 
obligations.  
 
From Principles to ‘toolbox’ 
One of the virtues of the Principles of European Contract Law lies in the 
accessible language, devoid of abstract concepts, in which they are couched 
(Schulze and Wilhelmsson (2008, p. 157). It was hoped that the Principles 
might have served as a basis for a set of non-mandatory ‘European’ 
contract terms, possibly attaining a degree of authority comparable to that 
of the American Restatement of Contract Law. In the event, the PECL 
came to be treated as a storehouse of ideas by those scholars, under the 
chairmanship of von Bar, who were appointed to the Study Group on a 
European Civil Code which succeeded the Lando commission in 1998. In a 
working paper produced for the European Parliament, von Bar (1999, 
p.137) set out the principal reasons why it would be unsatisfactory for the 
projected European code to apply to cross-border disputes alone “out of 
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respect for national sensitivities”. In his opinion “what we still tend to refer 
to rather inadvertently as an international case today has long since become 
an inter-regional case in the EU context” and “the artificial territorialization 
of private law within the European Union has to be overcome.” A 
European Code whose operation was restricted to cross border trade, von 
Bar argued, would create “demarcation problems” because any distinction 
between “domestic” and “external” was no longer “logical”. He continued: 
Another aim of a European Civil Code, moreover, must be to grasp the 
opportunity, which is veritably unparalleled in history, to improve and 
modernize private law in the areas that it covers. (ibid. p. 137) 
It is evident that two years previously Lord Goff had not envisaged 
anything quite so far-reaching, concluding instead (ibid., p.748) that we 
were “ perhaps more likely to see further international developments  on 
the lines of the Vienna Sales Convention or the ‘UNCITRAL’ Model of 
Arbitration Law.” In view of the promulgation of the Common European 
Sales Law in 2011 these words seem prescient; arguably, however, they 
represented no more than wishful thinking. 
 
The Study Group was initially charged by the European Commission with 
the drafting of a civil code. Subsequently this was modified in the light of 
clarification by the Court of Justice of the Commission’s competence in 
this particular field
4. The consequence was the drawing up the ‘draft’ 
version of a sui generis species of law, a Common Frame of Reference.  In 
passing it can be mentioned that French scholars, whose co-operation is 
ultimately essential to the realization of a Europe-wide law of obligations, 
                                                 
4
 The impact of the Tobacco Advertising cases are discussed further in Chapter 5 below. At a BIICL 
conference on 7
th
 February 2011, Ms Diana Wallis, at that time still the European Parliament’s 
rapporteur on the harmonization of Contract Law, stated in answer to a question on whether or not a 
European Civil Code was “now a dead letter”,  that such a code ‘never was a live letter’. She went on to 
say that Europe would not be ready for a Civil Code for at least a generation. 
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have evinced little enthusiasm for a proposed body of law that would 
supersede the Code Civil. This may be cited as one reason for a more 
cautious approach. In England, while the then Lord Justice Bingham felt it 
necessary to challenge Common Law practitioners on their tendency to 
have an insular outlook (Bingham 1992, p.1) the members of the House of 
Lords with the relevant expertise subsequently entered a period of 
constructive engagement with interested parties. 
 
The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) on publication in 2008, 
with a revision appearing in 2009, was hailed by Hesselink (2009, p.923), 
one of the co-ordinators of the Study Group for a European Civil Code, as 
representing such a code “in all but name”. For others, however, 
publication actually seemed evidence that the Commission lacked the 
courage of its convictions and had allowed the professed aim of many of 
the European Union’s foremost legal scholars, particularly those in Holland 
and Germany, to fall into desuetude in consequence of taking a decision 
which, in essence, was political rather than juridical. Conceding that the 
American Restatement had always been intended to be an authoritative 
instrument, Jansen and Zimmerman (2009, p.99) expressed surprise that 
Schulte-Nölke (2008, p.47f.) had cited “leading members of the Study 
Group” in support of his comparison of the DCFR to the Restatement. 
According to Jansen and Zimmermann, the lack of unanimity within 
Europe rendered it inappropriate for the DCFR to be equated with the 
Restatement (op.cit., p.103f.) There are a number of reasons why direct 
comparison with the United States of America is inappropriate, not least 
that the expression ‘Europe’ is used politically to denote the 27 states of the 
European Union and geographically to include former Eastern bloc 
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countries with scarcely embedded modern commercial laws and customs.   
The status of the DCFR in relation to the Principles was described 
pejoratively by Jansen and Zimmerman as an “eminently political” 
document, in which the DCFR, they claimed, had been “strategically 
abused” (op. cit., p.104) by being implicitly compared to the American 
Restatement. Likewise they regarded as inappropriate any comparison by 
Schulte-Nölke of either the PECL or the DCFR to a “map” of the relevant 
legal landscape within Europe (ibid., p.105).  Arguably reference to maps 
of any kind is apt to mislead unless it is certain that all the interested parties 
have a common ‘destination’ in mind. Nevertheless, previously 
Zimmermann had written approvingly of the manner in which Kötz (1981, 
p. 481ff; Zimmermann 2006, p.547 footnote 25) “had mapped the various 
ways in which comparative legal scholarship might attain a common 
private law in Europe.” Evidently Jansen’s and Zimmermann’s reservations 
about the ‘map’ metaphor employed by Schulte-Nölke reflect their 
disapproval of the legal ‘landscape’ that he envisaged. 
 
Unless the eventual Common Frame of Reference itself were to become 
“an optional instrument”, that is that it had the capacity to become “a 
closed and comprehensive system as it is known in the form of the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) in Germany” (Jansen and Zimmermann, 
op. cit., p.109) all talk of maps seems at best wishful thinking.  The 
prioritizing of an ‘optional instrument’, together with the increased usage 
of this expression, ensured that at least some progress was made even if 
this fell far short of the aspirations of those who had hoped for a more 
substantial legal document. An optional instrument is intended to offer a 
distinctly European legal framework which the parties partaking in cross-
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border transactions within or beyond the European Union, provided one is 
either a consumer or falls within the definition of a small to medium-sized 
enterprise (SME), may agree to use in preference to the national law of the 
party in whose home state the agreement was made. As mentioned above, 
the mooted “optional instrument” has since been realized and the extent to 
which the Common European Sales Law offers real choice to the 
economically weaker party will also be discussed in Chapter 5 below. 
 
Doubt was expressed by Jansen and Zimmermann (op. cit., p.109) 
concerning whether the DCFR would be effective as a “toolbox” because 
the definitions and rules cannot be referred to “in isolation” as they should 
be and could have been if the DCFR had indeed been a code in all but 
name. Whittaker (2009, p. 621) emphasized the point that the Common 
Frame of Reference that might follow the DCFR would be more than 
merely soft law – 
[T]he CFR could be used as an “optional instrument”, meaning a body of rules 
to be adopted by contracting parties … not … merely as terms (which is 
uncontroversial) but that they would be enabled to choose the CFR as applicable 
law. [author’s emphasis] . 
 
Believing that the DCFR “aspires to be a codificatory system”, Jansen and 
Zimmerman evidently hoped that their analysis and conclusions would be 
accepted by those who had produced the DCFR, and that a unified contract 
law analogous to a civil code would yet emerge. However, their sense that 
“the scholarly and political agendas” were “strictly separated” (op.cit., 
p.111) indicates that a degree of pessimism existed about the prospect of 
this goal being realized. They did not refer to the embryonic plan for a 
“Blue Button” in terms of standard European contract terms (Schulte-
22 
 
Nölke, 2007, p.349). It was this concept, rather than a European civil code 
as once envisaged, that formed the ‘landscape’ to which the “map” of 
relevant European law, as represented by the Draft CFR, was the key. The 
promulgation of the Common European Sales Law in October 2011, 
anticipated by Whittaker, followed a gestation longer than would have been 
the case had the energies of the Study Group on the European Civil Code 
not been diverted to the division of the Draft Common Frame of Reference, 
in code-like manner, into seven books. Such an arrangement could indicate 
one of two things. Conceivably the Study Group, having once been intent 
on drafting a European Civil Code, simply found difficulty in drafting a 
document of an entirely different character. With almost Delphic opacity, 
Schulze and Wilhelmsson argued (op. cit. p. 158): “[T]he structure of the 
DCFR can be a stimulating challenge  -  from a certain perspective  -  in 
order to promote the long-term exchange of ideas with regards to European 
private law.”  
 
Draft Common Frame of Reference and Codification  
Owing to the influence of the PECL, concepts such as freedom of contract 
and the binding effect of contracts within the DCFR are strongly coloured 
by civil law assumptions rather than being based on concepts shared by 
legal scholars in all jurisdictions. The principal merits of the DCFR that 
were extolled when scholars were eventually able to consider the entire text 
were its wider purview than the PECL and its capacity to serve as a 
‘toolbox’ in order to achieve greater coherence in the acquis 
communautaire of the future by means of optional provisions and 
mechanisms which could be employed by the Member States and 
interpreted by the Court of Justice. The code-like structure of the DCFR is 
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perhaps the most striking of its numerous ambiguities. Whittaker (2009, 
p.621) argued that the Draft Common Frame of Reference included 
indications that it might yet serve as a stepping stone to a European Civil 
Code.  The manner in which the DCFR’s own ‘Principles’ would work in 
practice is unclear, adding to an impression of excessive generalization, 
and, as Whittaker has pointed out, their very presence raises questions in 
view of the supposed function of any Common Frame of Reference as 
simply a ‘toolbox’ (ibid., p.638).  
 
Such apprehension as exists among English practitioners regarding the 
Commission’s policy on codification, both in the 1990s and subsequently, 
is based on concerns described by McKendrick as ‘fundamentally 
pragmatic’ (2006, p.19). Undoubtedly the ingrained habit of analogical 
reasoning that is characteristic of the Common Lawyer’s mode of 
argumentation would be threatened by the imposition of a codified system. 
Moreover, few would disagree that there is a natural aversion among 
Common Law practitioners to substitute something that might have 
unforeseen consequences for a system which, in spite of its idiosyncrasies, 
is regarded as offering a high degree of legal certainty for contracting 
parties, and whose advocates evince, in the barbed words of Lord Goff, a 
“readiness to face up to difficulties rather than pretend that they do not 
exist” (1997, p.747). Quite apart from the ostensibly academic but arguably 
political project of engrafting of Civil Law principles on to the Common 
Law tradition, there are certain matters the neglect of which suggests that 
certain protagonists were naïve regarding the time span necessary for the 
realization of a European Civil Code.  
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United Kingdom government representatives have stressed the importance 
of invisible earnings derived from clients who prefer to use English 
contract law. Clients would almost certainly turn to other Common Law 
jurisdictions if a European contract law based on Civil Law principles and 
practice became mandatory in England and Wales (Ashton 2006, p.246). 
The European Commission would be hardly less sanguine than the British 
government itself about the prospect of a vast annual loss of tax receipts to 
a Member State. Possibly it is because this objection to the harmonization 
of European contract law is based on financial rather than jurisprudential 
considerations it is less often advanced, yet it must be a vital consideration 
for policy makers. Possibly alone among commentators, Baroness Ashton 
(ibid., p.246) argued that the “best solution” was the “application of the 
principle of subsidiarity  -   in using  existing national legal systems to 
deliver real benefits to [EU] citizens in cross-border cases.”  
 
In spite of the negative assumptions of many Civil Law practitioners 
(McKendrick op. cit., p.19), for many years there has been less hostility in 
the legal profession to the principle of codification than many are apt to 
believe. The Sale of Goods Act 1893 and the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
were widely seen as examples of the successful codification of key aspects 
of English commercial law. In the 19
th
 Century a proposal for the 
codification of the rules of Evidence drafted by Sir James Stephen had even 
been announced at the beginning of a Parliamentary session (Stephen 1895, 
p.377f.). Paradoxically it is the attenuated nature of the political process 
rather than lack of enthusiasm on the part of jurists that have caused plans 
for codification to be stillborn. Any such proposal would have to spend so 
long being scrutinised in committee that the progress of legislation to 
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which higher priority was attached would be jeopardized. This was as true 
in the 19
th
 Century as it would be today: in the words of Stephen’s 
biographer, “The measure vanished in the general vortex which swallows 
up such things” (ibid., p.381). Under the Westminster system there would 
have to be cross-party support for any bill that sought to introduce the 
changes necessary to bring to fruition the degree of harmonization of 
contract law that has long been regarded as unexceptionable among many 
European comparative lawyers. A proposal for codification could hardly 
survive Parliamentary scrutiny if what was proposed was a step from 
relative legal certainty to a situation in which the outcome of a case became 
significantly less predictable. However, given sufficient incentive, it is 
submitted that common lawyers could make the transition to a system 
under which the settled case law formed the basis of a codified system.  
Indeed, the increased importance of case law in civil law systems 
(Whittaker 2009, p.625) in recent decades might be congenial to the 
common lawyer trained to argue by analogy irrespective of the absence in 
Europe of a doctrine of binding precedent (ibid. ftnt.71
5
). 
 
Within the English legal tradition codification is associated primarily with 
the name of Bentham (1748-1832) who is ranked among the late 18
th
 
Century rationalists whose thought has come to define ‘Modernism’.  A 
generation after Bentham, Austin laboured to establish English 
jurisprudence on criteria consistent with strict rationalism. These two 
important contributors to English legal history represent but one school of 
thought, however. Bentham was opposed by the statesman Burke (1729-
97), who is remembered today for his polemics against the excesses of 
                                                 
5
 MacCormick, D.N. and Summers, R.S., eds. (1997) Interpreting Precedents: a Comparative Study 
Chapter 18. 
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‘Reason’ under the French Republic. Burke is credited with founding the 
influential Historical School of jurisprudence mentioned above (p.5). If the 
disagreement between Bentham and Burke represents a fault line in English 
juridical thought, it nevertheless remains true that if presented as a ‘tidying 
up exercise’ codification accords well with English pragmatism.  
 
The advent of European legal concepts  
The apparently haphazard manner in which the harmonization of European 
contract law has proceeded indicates how difficult it is to achieve in 
practice if consent must first be sought. Since it is easier to harmonize 
those legal systems that have most in common, the danger exists that the 
policy of establishing a ‘Common Core’ will ultimately yield a 
‘Europeanized’ set of principles founded very largely on Civil Law 
notions. If this were to occur, non-Civil Law jurisdictions might be obliged 
over time to adapt themselves to what had been proposed. While the 
foregoing is not to say that there is no merit either in establishing standard 
European contract terms as advocated by Schulte-Nölke, it is clear that the 
note of uncertainty in European affairs has not been quelled either by the 
commission or by any of the academic consultants whose services it 
retains. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Novum ius commune Europaeum 
 
Publishers’ imprints and websites employing the expression “Ius 
commune” became commonplace in the 1990s, especially in Holland and 
Germany where enthusiasm has been strongest for what von Bar described 
to an English audience as “a continental type comprehensive civil law” 
(2000, p.78).  The notion of a revivified “common” law implied by this 
expression has been treated by proponents as a template for the 21
st
 
Century. For many the concept of the mediaeval Ius commune lends 
credibility to the vision of a single European ‘legal scholarship’, or ‘legal 
science’ in the modern age (p.35, below). However, the term Ius commune 
is seldom defined clearly, or analysed critically, by those who most 
frequently allude to it. The version of the ‘common past’ commonly 
presented by comparative lawyers is frequently over-simplified. This 
suggests that the Ius commune is employed principally as a useful tool in 
support Zimmermann describes a “re-Europeanised” law of obligations 
(1994, p.68). Since the 19
th
 Century the tradition of “legal scholarship” in 
Germany has served as midwife to the assumed priorities of the present, 
rather than existing as disinterested scholarship for its own sake.  
 
Evidence for the potentially misleading nature of imprecise treatment of the 
Ius commune by numerous European legal scholars is provided by 
Robinson et al (1994). The authors, who readily admit their difficulty in 
giving a sophisticated definition of the Ius commune, and also their 
inability to express the full meaning of the term succinctly, describe it as – 
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the complex result of the coming together  -  in varying proportions from place 
to place and from time to time -  of local custom with feudal law, Roman Law in 
modified and elaborated form, canon law and law merchant. (Robinson et al. 
1994, p.106) 
To this should be added the essential function of the Ius commune which 
was to serve neither as  a ‘corpus’ of law nor a legal system, but rather as a 
means of reaching a definitive position on some point of interpretation. 
According to Robinson et al. (ibid., p.106) its counterpart, the Ius 
proprium, comprised “the local law of territories and cities” being 
“dominated by custom and feudal usages”.  The expression Ius commune 
actually originated in ecclesiastical law signifying the general law of the 
Church as distinct from custom of only local applicability (Holland, 1924 
p.59, footnote 3), and was only subsequently employed by analogy in the 
secular law.  
 
The era when Western European scholars needed no passport other than 
proficiency in Latin had far-reaching implications for the resurgence of 
Roman civilization modified by Christian principles. In time the teaching at 
European universities of the Ius utrumque, both the canon and secular laws, 
became an integral part of this influence. The historian Knowles referred to 
a shared intellectual legacy from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries 
when educated Europe formed “a single undifferentiated cultural unit” 
(1962, p.80). However, in considering how the Ius commune has been 
treated by modern jurists, we have to bear in mind that, initially, legal 
studies at the highest level were not included in this ‘shared stock’.  
Knowles’s definition of Europe was not confined to the near Continent so 
that even if it could later be said that certain developments in England 
caused her legal practitioners gradually to diverge, nevertheless Latin 
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remained the lingua franca of scholars despite the vicissitudes of 
succeeding centuries. Moreover, as Kunkel observed, the characteristic 
features of Anglo-Saxon law “for all their individual nature still often 
remind one surprisingly of the structure of classical Roman law” (1973, 
p.185). 
 
12
th
 Century renaissance 
For more than a hundred years after its rediscovery in the sixth century, the 
Justinian Corpus iuris civilis was not widely studied and even in the 11
th
 
Century it was taught exclusively in Italy, notably at Bologna. Those who 
date the Ius commune to the era of the so-called ‘recovery’ of the Corpus 
iuris at this time do so in order to broaden the definition of the Ius 
commune from its original, quite narrow usage in order to include the 
secular law. For instance Bellomo (1995, p.xiii) argues that ever since the 
recovery there can be said to have existed “a common legal past” 
embracing all western Europeans: 
The legal norms of the Ius proprium found in the Ius commune 
principles, rules and technical terminology … .This was true when the 
Ius proprium  reacted against or diverged from the Ius commune; when 
this occurred, by choice or out of ignorance, it created a problem of 
comparison with, hence of relation to, the Ius commune. Thus for the 
keenest intellects and greatest jurists of Europe in the Middle Ages the 
Ius commune turned out to be a formidable unifying force. It lay at the 
centre of the law and was the symbol of its unity.   
Here the lines of what must in reality have been a complex process taking 
place across a variety of different cultures, and not always 
contemporaneously, are greatly simplified. 
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For the proponents of the unification of European  private law, the value of 
the Ius commune consists in its being a model for what Zimmermann (2006 
[2], p.1), echoing Bellomo, terms the “contemporary renewal of an old 
idea”. The inception of the Ius commune is dated by Zimmermann instead 
to what he terms the ‘so-called 12th Century renaissance’ (1994, p.82) i.e. a 
century and a half later than that suggested by Bellomo. Zimmermann’s 
point of reference is the publication in 1141 by Gratianus (F. 
Graziano,1090-1159), of the Decretum Gratiani, marking the beginning of 
an epoch during which it can accurately be said that ideas radiated from the 
law faculties of northern Italy. In the ensuing two centuries numerous other 
universities were founded, including Toulouse in 1229 and Cologne in 
1338. Gratian’s achievement had been to systematize the Canon Law in the 
same manner as the secular Civil Law, thereby facilitating the study of the 
Ius utrumque.  Since Canon Law was taught as a branch of theology, the 
mediaeval jurists, at Oxford and Cambridge as well as on the Continent, 
were almost exclusively ‘clerks in holy orders’. Indeed Baker (1990, p.178) 
questions whether it is appropriate to regard jurists of that era as 
constituting a legal profession.  
 
While it is true that both canon and civil law were taught “in every sizeable 
principality” after the manner of the Bologna law faculty (Zimmernann 
1994, p.83), this is chiefly true of those principalities that lie to the West of 
the Rhine and Danube. Although particular examples are not cited, 
Zimmermann avers that the law that the medieval jurists studied “seemed 
to be infinitely richer in detail, as well as in principle, than any local law or 
custom” (ibid., p.83) and the tradition thus founded was “truly European” 
in character. That he refers in this context to Justinian’s code rather than 
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purely to Canon Law is made clear when he describes the Corpus iuris as 
the “basis of our European common law”(ibid., p.85). Although during the 
early Middle Ages the interpretations of the commentators and glossators 
came to be regarded as authoritative (Robinson et al. op. cit., p.59) any 
analogy with the Common Law followed in England would almost 
certainly be misleading. Significantly Robinson et al. (op. cit.) do not 
directly equate the Ius commune with the Corpus iuris civilis, merely 
observing that in Germany as a result of the attempt to establish a 
“common law of the Reich” Roman law had “received recognition as, at 
the very least, a general subsidiary source of law.”  (op. cit., p.190) 
 
Fragmentation and defragmentation  
The perception, widely shared by writers on Comparative Law since being 
espoused by the late Helmut Coing (1912-2000), is that since the 18
th
 
Century the law on the European Continent has “been split up into a series 
of national systems” to the detriment of the Ius commune Coing 1973, 
p.515.  The advocates of rapid approximation of private law regard a 
process of ‘ever closer union’, as included in the Preamble to the original 
EC treaty and thus in the Preamble to the TFEU, as a means to arrest   -  
and subsequently reverse  -   the disintegration of the former Ius commune 
that Coing described.  Coing influenced a considerable number of 
comparative lawyers who were writing in the late 20
th
 Century. It is 
noticeable that in the second half of a paper published in 1994, 
Zimmermann not only chooses identical topics to those elaborated by 
Coing in his seminal paper two decades earlier but also discusses them in 
the same order. It is submitted, however, that in view of the differences in 
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outlook between medieval and modern jurists it is difficult to see how the 
Ius commune can serve as a template for the present. 
 
The term ‘defragmentation’, employed as a synonym for the closer 
approximation of private law, implies the former existence of a mass, or 
edifice, of law and legal scholarship which became subjected, in the words 
of Zimmermann, to ‘two hundred years of legal nationalization’ (2006 [1], 
p.570). Elsewhere he describes codification in the late 18
th
 Century as 
symptomatic of the ill-effects of what he terms the ‘national 
particularization’ of law 
up to and including the time of the so-called usus modernus pandectarum in the 
17th and 18th centuries, the whole of educated Europe formed a single and 
undifferentiated cultural unit. Lawyers who had received their education in one 
country could occupy a chair in a university in another. (1994, p. 83) 
 
The Latin phrase usus modernus pandectarum implies that the use made of 
Roman law by von Savigny (1779-1861) and other 19
th
 century German 
jurists of the Historical School of jurisprudence proved an effective check 
to the accelerating trend towards ‘national particularism’. The expression 
“a single and undifferentiated cultural unit” is evidently derived from 
Knowles (op. cit., 1962) but it is to be noted that Zimmermann, like 
Bellomo subsequently, extends the relevant era from three centuries to 
eight. In view of the great emphasis placed on the world of the Ius 
commune by modern jurists it is worth quoting more fully from the passage 
to which Coing (1973, p.507) was among the first to allude. According to 
Knowles (1962) the “great European revival”  
was in every sense of the word a supra-national movement, forming a republic 
of teachers, thinkers and writers. It had the characteristic peculiar to itself in the 
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history of Western Europe of becoming in its final development a supra-racial, 
yet wholly homogeneous culture.  For three hundred years, from 1050 to 1350, 
and above all in the century between 1070 and 1170, the whole of educated 
Western Europe formed an undifferentiated cultural unit. (p.80) 
 
Significantly, perhaps, Knowles goes on to point out that “we are speaking 
only of a small educated minority to which the land owning aristocracy in 
general, many monarchs, and even some bishops, did not belong.” Thus in 
reality the idealized culture without borders, which certain modern jurists 
regard as a template for the 21
st
 Century, existed exclusively on “the level 
of literature and thought” (ibid., p.81). 
  
It is important to be precise about “the whole of educated Europe”. The 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the era of Vacarius and Bracton in 
England, constituted an era when the ideal of scholars such as Bellomo, 
Coing and Zimmermann was indeed realized, although whether it may be 
equated with the Ius commune is open to doubt.  It is important to 
appreciate that the so-called ‘Reception’ of Roman Law by the German 
Empire in the late mediaeval era was not a single, transforming event. 
Beyond the old frontier of the Roman Empire, except in the environs of 
Cologne, Mainz and Munich, there existed the traditional Teutonic 
customary law. Accordingly, we should regard the Reception as the 
initiation of a process which continued for many decades and was not 
complete even as late as 1800. Indeed it may be plausibly argued that 
Savigny’s work during a critical period in the development of modern 
Germany represented a second ‘Reception’ of Roman law in that country. 
Only a generation before the Protestant Reformation, therefore,  it would 
not have been possible to refer to the Ius commune                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
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as existing in Germany in the sense as that used by Robinson et al (op. cit., 
p.106) but only as indicating that the Roman and Canon law formed “a 
common background knowledge of all educated lawyers in Europe” (ibid., 
p.107). Evidence was adduced by Kantorowicz (1937, pp.326f.) that the 
pretensions of the classically educated legal scholars in the German Empire 
caused widespread and persistent resentment when customary ways of 
settling disputes under the Landrecht were displaced by a foreign legal 
system. The same point is made by Paton and Derham (1972, p.548), in 
discussing the displacement of ultimogeniture as a principle of inheritance 
of property in favour of primogeniture.  
 
Impact of Protestant Reformation 
The impact of the Protestant Reformation on the Ius commune, in terms of 
both legal theory and practice, is seldom if ever discussed by contemporary 
comparative lawyers writing on the subject of harmonizing the law of 
obligations.  This is a significant omission. To portray Europe as being an 
undifferentiated cultural unit until the French Revolution is controversial; 
likewise to present the so-called ‘national particularism’ in matters of law 
as simply a by-product of Enlightenment rationalism has the potential to be 
misleading. The origins of the so-called ‘nationalization’ of law can be 
traced at least to the aftermath of the Reformation, in particular to the 
development of Natural Law which is associated principally with the Dutch 
jurist Grotius (Hugo de Groot, 1583-1645). The Natural Law of the 18
th
 
Century has been pejoratively described by Paton and Derham (1972, 
p.20), in reference to the ambitions of J.-E. Portalis, 1746-1807, and his co-
authors on the Code Civil, as “the shibboleth of immutable rules of law 
discovered by abstract reason.” However, inasmuch as Grotius had sought 
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to establish law on a foundation of humanity’s desire for self preservation 
and a conflict-free existence but without reference to the Unwritten Law 
(Walker 1980, p. 541), the existence of which for the mediaeval scholastics 
was axiomatic, the Natural Law school of the early 17
th
 Century should be 
regarded as the harbinger of Modernism. The cursory treatment of the post-
Reformation era by many contemporary legal scholars, together with their 
presentation of it as an extension of the Ius commune, confirms the 
impression that their interpretation and treatment of history is selective. 
 
Mapping a path to a common future 
Referring to his collaborators in this field of scholarship, Zimmermann 
asserts strongly held opinion in the manner and tone in which a scientist 
states propositions that have been proved by empirical means. “They have 
demonstrated,” he writes, “that awareness of the common past can facilitate 
the path towards the common future” (2006 [1], p.572). In reality it would 
be more accurate to state simply that much has been argued on the basis of 
a supposed ‘common past’. The latter is no more than a past during which 
certain common features were shared, and, as has been stated, not by all 
simultaneously 
In a basic sense Roman and canon law developed by the medieval jurists as the 
learned law were common to the habits of thought and background knowledge 
of all educated lawyers in Europe (with the partial exception of England) from 
the thirteenth century onwards … It was only in this sense that there was a ius 
commune in Germany between the collapse of imperial authority in the early 
thirteenth century and the deliberate and general adoption of Romano-canonical 
procedure in the higher courts in the late fifteenth century. (Robinson et al.,1994 
p.107) 
 
36 
 
It may additionally be observed that Zimmermann employs language of a 
strongly deterministic nature. His use, for example, of the definite article in 
the quotation cited above, implies that ‘the path’ to which he refers already 
exists and that it merely remains for an enlightened guide to show the fore-
ordained route to legal unification. Zimmermann employs verbs such as 
‘point out’ and ‘demonstrate’ in preference to ‘advocate’ and ‘suggest’ 
respectively.  
 
To be German and in favour of the extension of Savigny’s 
Rechtswissenschaft beyond national borders is, paradoxically, to be an 
internationalist. By careful selection of historical references Zimmermann 
is able to reach some bold conclusions. Legal historians, he claims 
have been among the first to point out that the national particularization of 
private law and private law scholarship in Europe is both unnatural and 
anachronistic (2006 [1], p. 572). 
In other words not only should comparative law be taught in order to 
realize the longer term  -  many would say laudable  -  goal of a European 
legal scholarship, but national legal systems should be regarded as 
outmoded. Zimmermann goes further arguing  
 “[I]t is open to doubt whether, apart from political considerations (a European civil 
code is a symbol of European unity), economic arguments can be advanced in favour of 
legal unification” (ibid., p.574). 
 
That Zimmermann’s writing style is persuasive is demonstrated by the 
unqualified acceptance of his contentions on the part of those academic 
commentators, such as Twigg-Flesner (2008, p. 2-4), who are broadly in 
favour of closer approximation of European legal systems. More 
surprisingly such a detached observer as Lord Mance (2006, p.17-18), a 
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Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, uncritically accepts the historical accuracy of 
the portrayal of the Ius commune as a unifying system. For those who 
remain to be persuaded of the validity of the author’s conclusions, as well 
as of his use of history in support of the arguments he adduces, academic 
writing of this kind, notwithstanding the author’s evidently wide 
knowledge of the subject, lacks sufficient precision to be convincing and 
leaves important questions unanswered.  
 
The role and influence of Helmut Coing 
Anyone wishing to reserve Comparative Law in Europe purely to the 
academic realm will find that hardly any project or study in the field of 
comparative Private Law in Europe today is launched without regard to 
what  Zimmermann terms “the process of Europeanization” (2006 [1], p. 
570). The process ante-dates the work of Lando and Beale by some years 
and can be traced back to the generation that first advocated a socially, 
politically and economically cohesive Europe. During this era the late 
Helmut Coing was highly regarded for his scholarship and breadth of 
vision. In view of this comparative lawyer’s influence, particularly on the 
succeeding generation of German jurists, it is at once necessary and 
instructive to establish the extent to which he shared the premises on which 
the arguments presented by advocates of closer integration in the 21
st
 
Century are based.  
 
In 1973, the year of the United Kingdom’s accession to the European 
Communities, the Ius commune was portrayed by Coing as having the 
potential to serve as a ‘common law’ for a United Europe in a paper 
entitled ‘The Roman Law as the Ius commune on the Continent’. Since this 
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paper encapsulates an approach to legal history which has been highly 
influential in Germany in the last four decades it is important to assess the 
assumptions on which its principal contentions rest. A number of instances 
are given by Coing of how he understood the Ius commune to have 
operated. For instance, in the late 17
th
 Century a Common Law judge, in 
determining a dispute concerning a merchant ship and its cargo captured in 
time of war, concluded that since there was no international agreement with 
France on which to settle the matter, the case, in Coing’s words “had to be 
decided on the rules of the Ius commune” and that “under the rules of that 
law, the French court was wrong” (1973, p. 505).  Coing went on to 
describe the Ius commune a “…a body of law developed out of the Roman 
law of Antiquity” (ibid., p. 505). The natural inference of the non-specialist 
British reader in the 1970s would have been that the Ius commune was 
systematized law comparable to the Ius civile or the Ius gentium of Ancient 
Rome, capable under certain circumstances of superseding national law. 
Whether or not the importance of the Ius commune has been exaggerated in 
the Civilian Law, tradition  -  particularly among those favouring the ‘re-
Europeanisation’ of law  -  it has not been held to be historically significant 
in the development of English law.  Coing described as follows the 
traditional manner  -  developed by Italian legal scholars during the Middle 
Ages  -   in which a decision was reached in the Civil Law jurisdictions  - 
a judge must first apply local customs and statutes but wherever he could not 
find an appropriate rule … he could turn to Roman Canon Law and fill in the 
gaps found in territorial or local law by the rules of Roman Law. (ibid., p. 513) 
 
Coing’s reference to Canon Law in this example indicates that he 
occasionally employed the term Ius commune in the narrow, traditional 
sense. As implied by the word “commune”, the Ius commune stood in 
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contrast to those ecclesiastical conventions that were merely local in 
application. As originally conceived, therefore, it can hardly be construed 
as having any significance for the secular law or civil society. However, 
inasmuch as the Church was the only institution in the Middle Ages to have 
an unbroken tradition reaching back to the time prior to the fall of the 
Roman Empire, it followed that ‘the general law of Christendom’, or 
Canon Law, was itself partially based on precepts derived from the 
jurisprudence of the later Roman Empire, as Coing himself implied (op. cit. 
p.514). Nevertheless, the phrase ‘under the rules of that law’ used by Coing 
in discussing the English maritime case is striking, since the Admiralty 
court in England applied the traditional conventions of western Europe 
which were in fact derived from the Consolato del Mare from the 
Mediterranean and, from the Baltic, the Laws of Visby. Accordingly, what 
Coing referred to as the Ius commune in this instance in fact had the 
characteristics of customary law (Ius proprium). As such it was the very 
antithesis of what he advocated. The nature of maritime law had long been 
recognized in England.  Holland (1924, p.133, footnote 3) cited the 16
th
 
Century theologian Hooker whom Montesquieu followed. Hooker stated 
that, besides mankind’s social and constitutional relationships being 
regulated by ethical and municipal law – 
there is a third kind of law which touches all such several bodies politic, so far 
as one of them hath public commerce with another, and this third is the law of 
Nations.
6
  
 
Although Coing employs the term Ius commune in a more restricted sense 
than does Zimmermann and other contemporary writers on the perceived 
benefits of a ‘re-Europeanised’ civil law, he nevertheless idealizes the Ius 
                                                 
6
 Ecclesiastical Polity i. c. x. s.12 ; cf Montequieu ‘Droit de gens’ in  Esprit de Lois i. c. 3 
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commune in such a manner that it is not always possible to gain a clear 
perception of the original historical context in which the Ius commune 
operated.   Moreover, the manner in which the legal history of Sweden is 
treated by both Coing and Zimmermann betrays a desire on the  part of 
both authors to see the acceptance of the Ius commune as to some degree as 
normative. 
 
The case of Sweden  
Both Coing and Zimmermann espouse a distinctive theory of history 
according to which the influence of the mediaeval jurists is equated with 
progress: “On the whole,” wrote Coing - 
the development [of the Ius commune] was complete by the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, some countries like Sweden still being behind. At this time 
the juristae, the university trained lawyers, dominated the civil service in the 
courts of the continental states. (1973, p. 512) 
 
While Coing seems to have tolerated the occasional ‘exception that proves 
the rule’ of his over-arching theory of the former existence a shared 
European mentalité in matters of law, Zimmermann and Whittaker (2000) 
are at pains to demonstrate that Sweden was not immune to the Ius 
commune. Accordingly we read that “since the 17th century Swedish-
Finnish law was (sic) deeply influenced by the European Ius commune” 
(pp.55-6). The grounds for making this claim are, firstly, that from the 17
th
 
Century all contracts made under the mediaeval law codes were construed 
as being contracts made in accordance with the principle of good faith, and, 
secondly, the passing into law of the Nordic Contracts Act, an early 
example of harmonized legislation agreed by non-belligerent nations 
during the opening years of the First World War.  In reality traditional 
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Swedish customary law already recognized a duty consistent with ‘good 
faith and fair dealing’. If Sweden did become ‘deeply influenced’ by 
Roman law concepts it was primarily by means of codification in the 19
th
 
Century, and not as claimed by Zimmermann and Whittaker. In 1811 a 
commission was established to replace the Rikes Lag of 1734, itself a 
codification of traditional custom law precepts (Robinson et al 1994, p. 
248). Since the new code was inspired by the principles of the French Code 
Civil, it appears -  paradoxically, and in contrast to what is often alleged 
about the ‘fragmentation’ of European law  -  that Swedish legal history 
tends to show that what is attributed to the spirit of the Ius commune in that 
country came about by the adoption of the legal standards of the 
Enlightenment shared elsewhere in Western Europe. Accordingly, the case 
of Sweden presents a challenge to the contention that the process of 
codification in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 Centuries, because it is alleged to have led 
to ‘national particularization’, was detrimental to legal ‘coherence’ in 
Europe. It is submitted that, far from being an illustrative example of 
Coing’s and Zimmermann’s thesis, the unique evolution of Sweden’s legal 
system in fact brings into question the entire historiograpical theory by 
which Zimmermann, following Coing, seeks to validate the goal of so-
called ‘defragmentation’ of legal traditions in the European Union. 
 
Coing and Savigny 
It is likely that Helmut Coing was the first German jurist to idealise the Ius 
commune. Although evidence that this had happened as early as the 18
th
 
Century is adduced by Coing himself (1973, p.506) in an example from 
European history which was related in order to convince English readers of 
the potential of a revived Ius Commune as a unifying factor, it is highly 
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likely that the expression Ius commune in this context is Coing’s own. The 
example related to the establishment of a new university at Berlin in the 
early 19
th
 Century. The advice given by Savigny to the Prussian 
government was that the new curriculum for the Faculty of Law, in order to 
have broad appeal, should not be based on Prussia’s law code of 1794 but 
instead “mainly on Roman Law as the Ius commune of Germany” . 
 
Savigny, who acted as Minister of Justice until the tumultuous events of 
1848, was convinced that the Justinian Corpus iuris contained a deposit of 
wisdom spanning several centuries, and that it, more than any modern 
code, had the capacity to yield answers to contemporary problems as they 
arose. When in 1814 he coined the term Rechtswissenschaft he meant 
intensive studies in the field of Roman law for the purpose of providing 
solutions to legal problems in modern society. His achievement, broadly 
speaking political in conception, was to bring academic and political 
opinion in Germany round to the idea that only Roman law could provide 
the terminology for the development of a common national law and 
jurisprudence of sufficient coherence for an era of rapid industrialization 
and social change. He considered the German language at that time as 
insufficiently developed for modern legal requirements. (Walker, 1980 
p.1103) 
 
Despite Savigny’s unequivocal championship of Roman law, it is 
insufficiently stressed by modern advocates of a ‘Europeanised legal 
scholarship’ that throughout his life he opposed the codification of law. His 
opposition to the proposal of Anton F.J. Thibaut (1772-1840) in 1814 for a 
national code tends to be presented as the intellectual triumph of the 
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Historical School over the adherents of the Natural Law school comprising 
the followers of Portalis and his co-authors of the Code Civil. Zimmermann 
(1994, p.81) quotes Savigny from the latter’s dialogue with Thibaut:  “As 
to what we aim at we are in agreement”, but this should not be taken to 
mean that they agreed that codification was desirable. What separates 
Savigny from Gustav von Hugo (1764 – 1844) and the other founders of 
the Historical School of jurisprudence, and in part what led him to oppose 
not only Thibaut but also any who would codify the law, was his insistence 
on the development of an objective legal science (Ryan 1962, p.30). ‘Legal 
science’ is an alternative translation of Rechtswissenschaft reflecting the 
strongly analytical nature of the academic tradition in Germany. While it is 
true that the German legal code which was published in 1900 “owed its 
maturity to the conceptual foundations laid down by the historical school of 
jurisprudence” (Zimmernann 1994, p.91), it is evident that this result owes 
more to accident than to design since the delay was caused partly by lack of 
political unity in the country, and partly by disputes between Savigny’s 
followers and opponents`.  Because Savigny believed in the superior 
‘coherence’ of Roman law over the non-systematized regional law that 
would have been the raw material for a codified law on Teutonic principles, 
his influence and that of his supporters ensured that the introduction of a 
legal code in Germany was deferred for at least a generation. Accordingly 
it is difficult to agree with Zimmermann’s characterization of the situation 
that has arisen in Europe since the inception of the European Union as 
“Savigny versus Thibaut all over again”. Claiming, by implication, to be 
preserving Savigny’s legacy, Zimmermann incessantly advocates the 
adoption of a uniform ‘coherent’ legal culture across the European Union.  
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He avers that the establishment of a European legal scholarship 
(Rechtswissenschaft) 
may, eventually, pave the way towards a codification as widely accepted in 
Europe as the Code Civil is in France or the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch … in 
Germany. (2006 [1], p.573)  
 
It is submitted that this aspiration is founded on a flawed representation of 
the dynamics of modern German legal history. For German scholars who 
eschew legal nationalism the process of the harmonization of law in the 
member states of the European Union is one by which Savigny’s vision of 
a lex Romanus redivivus for a unified Germany in the 19
th
 Century can be 
externalized and thereby consolidated, with modifications, at home.  No 
doubt the tradition of legal scholarship, which has been such a notable 
feature of German juridical thought since Savigny’s day, accounts in part 
for the vigour with which German jurists have in recent decades led the 
drive for what von Bar described as “a new Ius commune Europaeum”  
(Bar 2000, p.1).  No doubt, too, contemporary German Rechtswissenschaft 
is derived from Savigny’s perception, as a classicist turned lawyer, of 
Roman law as a perfected legal system. With the passage of time this, the 
characteristic view of Savigny and Mommsen (1818-1892), has become 
outmoded, and since it no longer serves as a viable basis for a European 
‘legal science’ it follows that nothing of substance has been proposed. 
Zimmermann (1994, p.81), argues for the ‘depositivising’ of national legal 
systems, adding that what is needed is a renewed historical school of 
jurisprudence which can “build on common, systematic, conceptual, 
doctrinal and ideological foundations which are hidden beneath the debris 
piled up during two hundred years of legal particularisation” (ibid., p.82).  
In view of Savigny’s resolute opposition to codification throughout his 
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career it cannot be assumed that he would have approved of a European 
civil code, a goal which was regarded as attainable until quite recently 
(Zimmermann 2008, pp.573, 577)  
 
Legal and jurisprudential affinities 
When Smits (1998, p.328) outlined the goal of achieving a uniform private 
law he included among his aims the removal of “the alleged 
contradistinctions between Civil law and Common Law”. During the 16th 
Century the Landrecht took precedence over the Roman law that was 
gradually being imposed throughout Germany by means of the institution 
known as the Reichskammergericht (Robinson et al. 1994, p.190f.). 
Regional variation in Law remained in Germany as late as the early 19
th
 
Century. As intimated above, despite the ‘Reception’ of Roman Law in the 
late Middle Ages, and the consequent establishment of the 
Reichskammergericht, adherence to local customary law remained strong.  
Many European jurists tend to see the English Common Law as an isolated 
manifestation of the Ius proprium or Customary Law which was 
widespread in different forms and in different places throughout Western 
Europe at that time. Thus it is an unintended consequence of the work of 
Savigny, and the codification of German law more than a century ago, that 
the continuation of the Common Law in England for so many centuries 
seems now to be no more than an historical anomaly. In Zimmermann’s 
opinion “the English common law remains embedded in a tradition which 
is bound to appear quaint and bizarre to the modern civil law observer” 
(1994, p.87). 
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Zimmermann elaborated his perception of the Common Law in an address 
given in Cardiff in 1996. In order to lend colour to his argument he cited 
Thomas Hogg, a 19
th
 Century barrister, author and rationalist who was 
offered the chair of Civil Law at University College London. Hogg 
contrasted the early 17
th
 century English judge Sir Edward Coke with the 
French jurist Cuiacius (Jacques Cujas, 1522-90), caricaturing Coke as, by 
comparison, no more advanced than a denizen of “the trackless jungle”. 
Zimmermann added:  
this is how many continental lawyers essentially still think today when 
confronted by the casuistic nature of English law with its bizarre traditionality 
(sic) or with its peculiar interlocking of common law and equity.(1996, p.587) 
 
The irreverent text from which Zimmermann quoted had been prepared as 
an inaugural address. Although it was never delivered due to lack of funds 
for the chair, it did eventually appear in print in 1831
7. Hogg’s audience 
would have consisted chiefly of liberals for whom Coke would have had 
iconic status for his early espousal of what we now refer to as ‘the rule of 
law’ for which he incurred the displeasure the king. The importance of this 
for subsequent developments is discussed in Chapter 3, below. For the 
Benthamites among Hogg’s listeners rationalization and codification of the 
Common Law was a priority. However, the words already quoted, and 
others comparing Coke to a ‘tattooed savage’, should have been understood 
as no more than self-deprecation indulged in for the purpose of reminding 
Hogg’s listeners, in an amusing manner, of the greatness of some of the 
Continental jurists:  after all, until the publication of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, Coke’s Reports were regarded as 
                                                 
7
 Hoeflich, M. ed. (1988)  The Gladsome Light of Jurisprudence: learning the law in England and the 
United States in 18
th
 to 19
th
 centuries London: Greenwood 
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the most authoritative exposition of the leading cases in England, for 
generations being referred to simply as ‘The Reports’ (Denning 1982, 
p.222).  
 
Apparently failing to appreciate the humorous aspect of Hogg’s 
iconoclasm, Zimmerman continued (1996, p.587), “Indeed, the English 
themselves like to cultivate the notion of their law as flourishing in noble 
isolation from Europe.” The original context from which this observation is 
taken indicates that the “noble isolation” that Zimmermann implicitly 
deprecates as ‘legal nationalism’ was not intended by the phrase’s author, 
Baker, to mean that there was any lack of affinity between the principles of 
justice enshrined in the Common Law and those in the Civil Law. 
According to Professor Baker (1990, p.35), the difficulty for mediaeval 
practitioners of the Common Law was that  
even its more abstract doctrines were not easily transportable to countries which 
had different systems of courts and knew nothing of writs and juries. And so 
English law flourished in noble isolation from Europe, and even … from parts of 
Britain.  
 
Accordingly, it was the distinctive features of the English legal system, 
rather than lack of affinity with the essentially Roman concepts of the Ius 
commune, that primarily accounts for the separate evolution. Subsequently 
the Common Law judges found they had enough resources of their own on 
which to draw in cases of difficulty. Holland (op. cit., p.69) cited a 17
th
 
Century Master in Chancery who stated that English judges ‘do not refer to 
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Roman civil law or to that of other European nations but rely on their own 
judgement and conscience’8.  
 
At times, like Coing before him, Zimmermann draws attention to the 
underlying affinity between England’s legal norms and those of her near 
neighbours. A generation previously Coing had stated that “the English 
Common Law has never been completely separated from legal 
developments on the Continent” (1973, p.516). However, while 
Zimmermann concedes that it is not difficult to understand “the English 
common law as a specific emanation of a European, or Western, legal 
tradition” (1996, p.589) he appears to draw no more conclusions from this 
than did Coing for disinterested legal scholarship. Zimmermann (ibid., 
p.590) added that the late Lord Bingham had referred to the possibility of 
England “rejoining” the European mainstream and that Lord Goff of 
Chieveley had found “hardly any difference between English and German 
law as far as application and development of the law by the judiciary are 
concerned.” Because Zimmermann considers the separate identity of the 
Common Law a major “objection” to “creating a common European legal 
science” (ibid., p.587) the inference that the reader is invited to draw from 
both remarks is that the assimilation of the English legal system into that of 
the Continental Civil Law systems is overdue. 
 
Previously Zimmermann had argued that in order to secure an appropriate 
point of departure for “the restoration of a common European 
jurisprudence,” two inter-linked propositions had to be “addressed” (1994, 
                                                 
8
 ‘… non recurrunt ad ius civile Romanorum, ut apud alias gentes Europeas, sed suo arbitrio et 
conscientiae reliquuntur.’ Duck, A. [1653] Usu. et Auct. ii. c. 8. 6, 8  
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p.87). The first of these propositions is that England is a legal ‘island’ as 
well as a geographical one, and the second that her legal profession 
obstinately adheres to her ‘bizarre’ legal system. In order to dispose of the 
first of the two propositions, Zimmermann states that he had tried 
to show that the notion of the English common law as constituting an entirely 
autochthonous achievement is a myth.  For in reality, England was never 
entirely isolated from continental legal culture.  (ibid. p.87) 
In view of the considerable range of external influences on legal and 
political developments in the British Isles over the centuries it is doubtful 
that a British or Irish legal historian would ever describe legal development 
in any corner of them as “autochthonous”. Moreover, that adjective is 
inappropriate for describing a development resulting from a substantial 
degree of geographical and political isolation. The use of the word 
‘autochthonous’ by Zimmermann indicates that he interprets the English 
Common Law as a surviving example of Teutonic customary law, albeit 
modified by Civil Law principles. While the term ‘autochthonous’ would 
not be an appropriate adjective in the context of English legal history, it 
would be entirely apposite with reference to ancient laws or customs that 
were not derived from another culture. Evidently Zimmermann has 
interpreted the essential nature of the Common Law in such a way as to 
accord it the same standing in English life as the Landrecht used to have in 
some German principalities prior to the Reception of Roman Law when in 
“consequence of the political fragmentation of Germany, German law of 
the Middle Ages was fissured into innumerable local legal systems.” 
(Kunkel 1973, p.186) 
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Coing had hardly been controversial when he averred that it would be 
inaccurate to regard England as never having been affected by the Roman 
Canon Law; it was – 
also clear that the mediaeval law schools in Oxford and Cambridge taught 
Canon and Roman Law. What is more, in the 12
th
 and 13
th
 centuries there were 
English judges having a broad background of knowledge of the Roman Canon 
Law.” (1973, p.515)  
In this context Coing cited the Dutch legal historian R. C. van Caeneghem 
to the effect that Roman law came to England ‘too late’ to impress English 
law with the characteristic features of the Civil Law jurisdictions
9
. The 
necessary inference is that Professor van Caeneghem had a low estimation 
of the importance of Bracton (d. 1268), author of Concerning the Laws and 
Customs of the English, as displaying the erudition of one trained in the 
Bologna tradition. Nor does he accurately reflect the degree to which 
European jurists in the 11
th
 to 13
th
 centuries formed an international clerisy. 
Kunkel (1973, p.185) assessed this critical period in English history 
differently:  
The Anglo-Saxon area remained excluded from this great legal family because 
England, which in the twelfth century  -  the time of the early flowering of the 
Glossator-school  -  had come under the first influences of Roman law, later 
consciously closed itself to these influences. 
 
To a degree Coing’s opinions concurred with those of Ryan (1962), but the 
latter (op.cit., p.23) also reached a different conclusion: 
The history of English law has been marked not by the reception of a foreign 
system and its infusion with native institutions, but instead by the growth of a 
body of rules newly fashioned by the king’s justices and developed by their 
                                                 
9
 Royal Writs in England from the Conquest to Glanville London: Selden Society LXXVII, 1959 
51 
 
successors in which neither Roman law nor the customary law was a decisive, or 
even a considerable, influence.  
 
It is to be noted that, in advocating the establishment of a new Ius 
commune, Coing attaches insufficient weight to the fact that the formal 
Reception of Roman Law in those parts of Germany beyond Cologne and 
Munich, where Roman influence had always been strongest, occurred some 
two centuries later than the era that he, in common with later writers, 
regards as the golden age of the Ius commune. Arguably, were it not for the 
immense influence of the classicists Savigny and Mommsen in the 19
th
 
Century, the importance of which was stressed by Kunkel (1973, p.191), 
the Reception of Roman Law four centuries earlier might have come to be 
regarded today as no more than a half-hearted attempt to impose uniformity 
on Germany. 
 
The most significant single factor in legal history is the influence of 
individual jurists. These may be famous names such as Bracton and Lord 
Mansfield in England, Portalis in France and von Savigny in Germany. No 
doubt every legal system owes a debt to one or more jurists of comparable 
stature. The decline in the influence of the Roman Law in England during 
the 14
th
 Century can be ascribed to the introduction late in the previous 
century by an energetic king, Edward I, advised by the Italian Franciscus 
Accursius, of the policy of appointing laymen to the judiciary (Baker op. 
cit., p.179f). From this time too, as Coing (op. cit. 1973, p.516) readily 
concedes, English lawyers received their training at the Inns of Court in 
London and by exposure to the court system. In consequence of English 
lawyers no longer studying with the juristae of the universities, the nature 
of their knowledge became less abstract and more attuned to the 
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practicalities of the administration of justice. Had it not been for such 
reforms, it is likely that the English legal system to day would share the 
essential characteristics of a Civil Law jurisdiction.  
 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Coing and Zimmermann were 
united in attempting to subordinate both historical actualité and legal 
scholarship to an essentially political programme intended to create a 
supra-national legal culture in Europe. The era that followed the 
rediscovery of the Justinian Corpus was summarized, together with the 
impact that this discovery had on subsequent developments in Europe, by 
Professor Kunkel (1973). He stated that the legal science that rapidly 
became “the basis of a common European legal culture”, lasting until the 
present era, only blossomed in the schools of the mediaeval universities 
from the 15
th
 Century onwards. In comparison with the legal systems in 
England and France which had been established previously under royal 
authority, Germany’s “innumerable local legal systems” found resistance to 
the imposition of Roman Law by the Reich difficult. An English translation 
of the sixth edition of Kunkel’s Römische Rechtsgeschichte, originally 
published in 1966, appeared in 1973. Its publication coincided with that of 
Coing’s paper in the Law Quarterly Review, the title of which  -  ‘The 
Roman Law as the Ius commune on the Continent’  -  was evidently 
phrased so as to appeal to the English legal profession and to hint at the 
possibility of establishing a reinvigorated Ius commune in a manner 
analogous to the Common Law. However, it is not without significance 
that the expression ‘Ius commune’ was not included by Professor Kunkel 
in his work. The current widespread usage of the expression can, without 
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difficulty, be traced directly to the period in which Coing was writing and 
teaching, but not before. 
 
 
__________________ 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Professor Legrand’s Seminal Paper 
  
 
During the decade following the passing of the Single European act 1986 it 
was frequently asserted that there was already at work a process of 
convergence of law among the Member States. The increased economic 
activity among European consumers gave rise to what Markesinis (1994, 
p.1) termed ‘the gradual convergence’ of European contract law, the phrase 
being incorporated into a book title. Lest the 1990s should come to be 
characterized by a sense of an onward march to the foreordained goal of a 
European Civil Code early in the new century, Legrand’s paper ‘European 
Legal Systems Are Not Converging’ (Legrand, 1996) directly contradicted 
Markesinis and like-minded comparative law scholars (ibid., p.54). 
Legrand intended to refute what he regarded as a widespread fallacy and to 
constitute a challenge to rethink from first principles. His paper appears to 
have been successful in giving enthusiastic supporters of rapid progress 
towards a Europe-wide Law of Obligations pause for thought. 
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Arguing that the Common Law and the Civil Law were on diverging 
‘trajectories’ Legrand invited academic legal writers in Europe to 
reconsider the grande idée of a European legal unity enforced in the name 
of humanist rationality and grounded in the premise that legal homogeneity 
is the optimal basis for the European Community to prosper (Legrand 
1996, p.80).  The reader senses here profound opposition not only to any 
European Union-sponsored drive towards the ‘Europeanisation’ of law, but 
also to the entire process that began with the publication of the first volume 
of Lando and Beale’s ‘Principles of European Contract Law’ (1995). This 
antagonism constitutes in effect an invitation either to accept unreservedly 
or to reject utterly one of Legrand’s principal propositions, namely that the 
systematization of law that is characteristic of the Civil Law regimes is 
repugnant to anyone trained in the Common Law tradition. As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, occasional attempts have been made to secure Parliamentary 
time in order to codify by statute aspects of the Common Law, so it would 
be misleading to insist that such repugnance as does exist is either innate or 
universal. 
 
In furthering his professed aim of “contribut[ing] to a better understanding 
of the culture of English Common Law” (ibid., p.74).  Legrand postulates 
the existence of a profound dichotomy between the prevailing culture of 
Civil Law countries and the English legal tradition. The significance in this 
context of the early 17
th
 Century English jurist Coke is discussed below. 
Continental lawyers without personal experience of the operation of the 
Common Law may have been impressed by Legrand’s forceful argument 
that the legal system that was developed by Common Law judges is not 
only epistemologically distinct from the Civil Law system but also 
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intimately connected to habit and custom. Legrand is at pains to stress that 
the ‘otherness’, as he terms it, of the Common Law does not mean anything 
more than that lawyers with different ‘acculturation’ (ibid., p.78) can only 
understand each other by an effort of the imagination, but not in the manner 
of lawyers from the same tradition who naturally understand each other’s 
terms of reference.  
 
This chapter represents a critique of the arguments adduced by Legrand in 
favour of the proposition that the characteristic differences between the 
Civil Law and Common Law systems denote incompatible processes of 
legal reasoning arising from widely differing historical experience in terms 
of both the genesis and evolution of institutions. Legrand does not deny 
“the existence of a long-standing and important influence of the Civil Law 
tradition on English law” but such recognition, instead of being discussed 
fully is consigned to a footnote (ibid., p.62, n.41). Throughout his paper 
Legrand exclusively adduces arguments that support his contentions, but he 
chooses not to address or attempt to refute any conceivable objections to 
his thesis. One consequence of this is that there is no analysis of whether 
his principal contentions might be true of one area of law but not of 
another. Moreover, it is at least conceivable that the divergent ‘trajectories’ 
to which he refers may ultimately be turned and that the closer 
approximation of English and Continental law with regard to contracts that 
existed as a result of Lord Mansfield’s judicial activism during the 18th 
Century may one day return. To state this, however, is not necessarily to 
contradict Legrand’s contention that the “analysis of European legal 
integration at the level of posited law suggesting a convergence of legal 
systems is misleading” (ibid., p.61). 
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Values, presuppositions and outlook  
Lying behind the articles of differing law codes in the Civil Law tradition, 
and the authoritative decisions under the Common Law, are the values and 
presuppositions of the cultures that produce them. According to Legrand, a 
‘rule’ contained within a law code inevitably comes about as a result of 
negotiation between interested parties. It thus connotes ‘a socio-cultural 
dimension which … remains inherent’ (ibid., p.57). This naturally results in 
what he terms “nationalistic legal positivism”.  The expression ‘legal 
positivism’ is frequently referred to by Legrand, but not elaborated upon. 
Accordingly we should give this expression its conventional meaning so 
that the ‘centrifugal’ effect of the ‘nationalism’ to which he alludes is in 
fact asserting no more than that each polity prefers the positive law that it 
has grown accustomed to. If the implication of this is that different legal 
systems will not naturally converge without a centripetal force to offset the 
natural tendency he describes, Legrand’s observation can hardly be termed 
controversial. Indeed, despite using the word ‘nationalistic’, a word which 
is usually understood pejoratively, Legrand does not base his argument 
merely on the observation that legal systems tend not to converge naturally. 
Instead he evinces an antagonism to rules qua rules. The essence of 
Legrand’s contention is that the concept of Law encompasses the entire 
wealth of moral, social and psychological antecedents that lies behind the 
private law in any given society. He sees a danger in regarding the ‘rules’ 
as equating with ‘law’ in the fullest sense. The consequence of adhering to 
a “law-as-rules” interpretation, much comparative law work has, 
paradoxically, become an epistemological barrier to more profound legal 
knowledge. (ibid., p.60; and n.38) 
57 
 
 
Whereas a community, or polity, can be formed on a variety of bases  -   
ethnic, linguistic, religious or even on the basis of a legal system or 
tradition  -   culture is the coming to fruition of a series of ‘collective 
mental programmes’ (ibid., p.56). The last term is rendered by Legrand as 
‘Weltanschauungen’  -  the plural of a word invariably employed by 
German writers in the singular.  Usually the term Weltanschauung is 
rendered into English as ‘world-view’ or simply as ‘outlook on life’. 
Indeed towards the end of his paper Legrand himself (op. cit., p.79) cites 
Munday (1983) to the same effect: ‘a lawyer brought up within a system of 
judge-made law has a legal outlook utterly different from one who has 
grown up within a codified system”10. The term ‘outlook’ also serves as an 
adequate rendering of what commentators mean by mentalité. However, it 
is arguable that what is significant is not so much the ‘outlook’ of the jurist 
as the methodology of the practising lawyer. The latter encompasses the 
way things are done in a practical sense   -  including how Law is learnt  -   
and, importantly, the process by which judicial decisions are reached. In 
terms of the debate about the convergence of European private law, such 
methodological differences are arguably more significant than the 
apparently divergent legal doctrines.  
 
By employing four epistemological categories   -  descriptive, inductive, 
deductive and axiomatic  -  Legrand plausibly contrasts the ‘inductive’ 
reasoning practised under the Common Law with  the ‘axiomatic’ nature of 
Civil Law argumentation
11
. He contends (op. cit., pp.64-65) that the 
Common  Law  
                                                 
10
 Munday, R.  (1983) ‘The Common Lawyer’s Philosophy of Legislation’ 14 Rechtstheorie p.191 
11
 Blanché R.,  (1983) L’épistemologie  (3rd edn), p. 65 
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has not left the inductive stage of methodological development. … One cannot 
axiomatise English legal thought, for Common Law lawyers use discrete 
inductive ideas capable of functioning only within limited factual spheres.  
If this analysis is correct it follows that analogical reasoning remains 
indispensable to the Common Law judge or jurist. Legrand’s wariness of 
any systematization rendering legal categories axiomatic arises because in 
his view under the Civil Law systems the facts of a particular case ‘are 
immediately inscribed within a pre-existing theoretical order where they 
soon vanish’. For Legrand one of the virtues of the Common Law is that 
the factual basis of authoritative case law is never lost sight of. However, to 
assert as Legrand does, that the axioms of Common Law could never be 
successfully distilled from the factual matrix out of which justice in each 
English case is wrought, is to overlook the fact, mentioned above, that on a 
number of occasions in the last century and a half key aspects of English 
law, such as Marine Insurance, have been brought together in what for all 
practical purposes are tantamount to codes.  
 
Codification  and   pragmatism 
Not long after Legrand’s seminal paper was published, von Bar (1999, 
p.137) acknowledged that Legrand’s thesis did not lack substance. He 
stated that the European Commission’s objective in the first instance 
can only be the creation of a sort of basic law of property upon which the 
Member States of the European Union can agree without forfeiting their evolved 
national legal cultures (their legal identities as some will say) at a single stroke. 
Unity can therefore grow from a kernel without any overambitious attempts to 
uproot the rich diversity of legal traditions.  
These significant words foreshadowed the Commission’s change of policy 
which first manifested itself subsequently when the policy of achieving a 
hard law instrument by 2010 was abandoned in favour of improving the 
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Consumer Acquis. In the same context the Common Law tradition was 
referred to specifically by von Bar – 
Nor would any harm be done to the legal systems of the British Isles. They 
themselves, after all, already possess partially ‘codified’ structures, the law on 
the sale of goods being one example. (ibid., p.137)  
The implication of these words seems to be that if one area of contract law 
has been consolidated by Parliamentary statute, then adaptation to an over-
arching European civil code could be achieved leaving the Common Law 
tradition intact for other aspects of domestic law such as Tort. It is not as 
though what von Bar construes as partial codification has only occurred in 
relation to contract law, since aspects of the criminal law, in addition to the 
law governing marine insurance, have likewise been consolidated. A partial 
or quasi- codification by means of an Act of Parliament requires little no 
change in the analogical reasoning and reference to binding case law which 
characterize the methodology of the Common Law system. Legrand (op. 
cit., p.65) stresses English pragmatism in legal matters and quotes with 
approval Weir who avers that this tradition “is more concerned with result 
than method, function than shape, effectiveness than style”12.  
 
Enlightenment Era of Codification 
A key aspect of the rationale of Enlightenment era codification was the 
perceived need to set the application of law on principles which did not 
need to be underpinned by reference to an unwritten moral law. 
Accordingly the principles needed to be rigorously logical and the 
constituent parts consistent with one another. Part of this process was 
political, broadly speaking, in that the act of removing legal anomalies has 
                                                 
12
 Weir,T. ‘The Common Law System’ in David, R. ed.  (n.d.) International Encyclopaedia of 
Comparative Law vol. 2 
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the effect of bringing greater cohesion to the nation state. This is important 
in terms of what Legrand has to say about legal culture. From the late 18
th
 
Century onwards jurists in Continental Europe applied Modernist 
principles to the administration of justice with the result that a citizen’s 
position in relation to his family, his society and the State reflected the 
prevailing intellectual climate. Nevertheless its authors were content to 
adopt certain reforms of commercial law instituted by Colbert in the era of 
the Absolute Monarchy as well as the traditional coutumes de Paris. That 
there were bound to be imperfections in any codified system was 
recognized by those who oversaw the promulgation of the Code Civil: 
A code, however complete it may seem, is no sooner finished than a thousand 
questions present themselves to the magistrate. For these laws once drafted 
remain as written. Men on the other hand never rest. They are always moving; 
and this movement, which never ceases and whose effects are variously 
modified by circumstances, continually produces some new fact, some new 
outcome. Many things are therefore necessarily left to the authority of custom, 
to the discussion of learned men, to the arbitration of the judges. (Portalis et al. 
1801, para.32) 
 
In the France that had survived until the Age of Reason there had been two 
distinct juridical areas  -  that part of the country south of Bordeaux in 
which ‘le droit ecrit’, in other words Justinian law, had been accepted for 
centuries, and secondly ‘les pays de droit coutumier’, that is customary law 
of Germanic origin dating back to the collapse of the Roman Empire in the 
West. During the high Middle Ages, conformably with Helmut Coing’s 
depiction of the workings of the Ius commune, the Roman law of the 
Justinian Pandectae was influential in the universities. However, it was 
never esteemed for practical purposes by the French kings who associated 
it with the Holy Roman Empire whose political ambitions they had resisted 
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for many years.  According to Ryan (1962, p.16) in those areas of France 
where the Roman law was introduced, as in Germany for years after its 
‘Reception’, it was used solely as an “infiller” where the droit coutumier 
was silent.  Over time the customary law was collated and published, for 
example under the Ordnance de Montils-les-Tours of 1453 which marked 
the end of the protracted struggle with England known as the Hundred 
Years War.  Thus in France, as among the German principalities, and 
indeed as in England, the ‘interface’ between customary law and written 
law played a more significant part in national life than is generally 
recognized. Portalis and his colleagues in 1800 succeeded in removing the 
grounds for Voltaire’s jibe that in France a traveller changed law as often 
as he changed horses. In Ryan’s words (1962, p.29) they did so 
in a manner which has evoked so strongly the enthusiasm and national pride of 
the French people that any large measure of reform is extremely difficult to 
carry through. 
 
Notwithstanding the well-known reticence of French jurists towards the 
concept of a Civil Code for Europe it would be an exaggeration to 
characterize every academic writer on Law in France either as a legal 
nationalist or a supporter of the use of Reason for ideological reasons. In 
spite of its imperfections the Code Civil has been influential in Europe, 
North and South America and, suitably adapted, in Egypt and other parts of 
the Muslim world.  It is of interest to note that the essentially Germanic 
droit coutumier survived the process of codification by incorporation into 
the Code Civil and thus were not obliterated. This kind of customary law is 
significant in that its existence hitherto in France serves as an example of 
the cultural dimension of the questions surrounding codification so central 
to Legrand’s contentions. If we follow the necessary inference from 
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Zimmermann (1994, p.87) and regard the Common Law in England as 
essentially a species of the consuetudo once existing in France and 
Germany, no doubt its axioms could be incorporated within an English 
civil code. It might be argued that such a code is a necessary precursor to 
the promulgation of a European Civil Code since one would expect to meet 
a degree of resistance from the legal profession to any proposition that 
entailed a change in methodology and reasoning so profound as to 
constitute a revolution. The evidence suggests that the Common Law  -  or 
perhaps one should say English law taking into account elements of both 
the Common Law and the Civil Law  -  is less rigid and more readily 
adaptable, by a process of addition and accretion, than any codified system.  
Codification of European contract law would not require merely the 
adaptation of English law but its transformation  -  not an evolution but a 
revolution.  
 
Legrand’s eclecticism leads him to employ the categories of the French 
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss. “When you submit habits and thoughts 
to the grindstone of reason, you pulverize ways of life based on long-
standing traditions” -  a process that is said to have a dehumanizing 
effect
13
. Moreover, Legrand argues that we should “reverse the process of 
aestheticisation of the legal.” The term “aestheticisation”, signifying 
‘formal arrangement’ is derived from the German philosopher Baumgarten 
(1714-62). Instead of ‘aestheticising’, jurists, according to Legrand, should 
learn to “embrace habits and customs” rather than “rules and concepts” 
such as those found in the Justinian Pandectae (Legrand op. cit., p.60). As 
such his argument is no more than a resurfacing of the traditional 
                                                 
13
Levi-Strauss, C. and Eriobon, D. (1988) De près et de loin p. 165 
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antagonism between the Historical and Natural Law schools of 
jurisprudence. 
 
Not surprisingly, in Legrand’s opinion the pragmatic approach taken by 
English judges is to be preferred to the inexorable application of ‘legal 
science’. Although the dangers of the merely mechanical application of 
legal principles were criticized in the 1920s by the Benjamin Cardozo, the 
American was not the first jurist to see them. In 1886 von Jhering collated 
a series of his own satirical articles published anonymously, in which he 
lampooned the tendency to apply the regional Civil Codes that existed prior 
to the promulgation of the BGB to the extent of reaching ludicrous 
conclusions
14
. Legrand quotes approvingly the more recent words of 
Griffiths LJ in Ex parte King [1984] - 
[T]he Common law of England has not always developed on strictly logical 
lines, and where logic leads down a path that is beset with practical difficulties 
the courts have not been frightened to turn aside and seek the pragmatic solution 
that will best serve the needs of society
15
.  
It is arguable, however, that this is simply an application, perhaps 
unconscious, of the principle “the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number” derived from the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill. Atiyah 
(1979, p.372) states that there was “a considerable degree of personal 
contact between lawyers on the one hand , and the political economists and 
the Benthamite  utilitarians on the other” in the 1830s and 1840s and that 
exposure to this doctrine influenced the jurisprudence of John Austin 
(ibid.). This rationalist and Natural Law theorist of the 19th Century was in 
regular contact with jurists on the Continent, including Savigny. The 
                                                 
14
 Jhering, R. von (1886) Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz (“Jest and Seriousness in Jurisprudence”) 
15
 [1984] 3 All ER 897, 903 CA –  
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importance of the affinities between Common and Civil Law categories of 
thought in the 19
th
 Century is discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
Developments in Germany in 19
th
 Century 
The century preceding the publication of the BGB is a crucial period in the 
historical process by which codified law came to dominate European legal 
thought. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, the reaction of Thibaut 
and others against the reception of foreign legal ideas was understandable 
and many enthusiasts of the historical school, rather than adapting existing 
laws for a society undergoing an Industrial Revolution  -  with its 
concomitant alteration in human relationships that Marx was among the 
first to identify  -  devoted their research into the customary law of the 
German people that existed prior to the ‘Reception’ of Roman law in the 
late 15
th
 Century. The inevitable ‘Kulturkampf’ implicit in this activity was 
deprecated by Savigny whose ideal for the German legal system, should it 
achieve unity, could be described as perfected Justinianism without 
recourse to codification. 
 
Legrand’s rejection of the principle of the codification of law, as much in 
the 6
th
 Century as in the 19
th 
, places him in sympathy the Hegelian doctrine 
of the Volksgeist, the ‘spirit’ -  or ‘innate consciousness’  -  of the people. 
While Legrand does not fall into the error of mystifying the Volksgeist of 
the English-speaking peoples  -  supposing that there is in fact a single such 
‘geist’  -   his previously mentioned remarks about the ‘aestheticisation’ of 
law nevertheless constitute a body blow directed at  the era of codification 
during the 18th -19th Centuries, and, by extension, to any plans for the 
codification of the law of obligations in the European Union.  
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Legrand’s inferences regarding Convergence  
Legrand argues that in both of the two legal traditions represented within 
the European Community there exists “an irreducible element of 
autochthony constraining the epistemological receptivity to globalization” 
(op. cit., p.79). Since the history of the ‘droit ecrit’ in Languedoc 
demonstrates that in fact the legal precepts derived from the Justinian 
Corpus can over time become part of regional cultural patrimony it must be 
inferred that ‘autochthony’ is being used loosely:  if the term were used 
narrowly only the traditional, customary law of the Scandinavian nations 
and Germany would satisfy the definition. It would seem to be implicit in 
Legrand’s use of this term that the modern law codes developed by jurists 
in France and Germany, in particular, were, in a material sense, artificial 
and must, to a lesser or greater degree, have run contrary to the habits, 
customs and societal norms that had hitherto existed within their respective 
jurisdictions. However, one simplifies in order to clarify: despite Savigny’s 
conviction of the supposed superiority of the jurists of the later Roman 
Empire, and to the idealized Ius commune that existed subsequently, there 
is no doubt that the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch is profoundly influenced by 
the philosophical tradition of Leibniz and Hegel. Moreover, behind that 
tradition it is possible to detect the genuinely ‘autochthonous’ principle of 
‘bounden duty’ (Pflicht) in Teutonic thought.  If ‘autochthony’ is construed 
in terms consistent with ‘innate consciousness’  -  and hence with Hegel’s 
Volksgeist  -  Legrand’s observation seems to be saying little more than that 
legal systems, codified or not, reflect the genius of the respective peoples 
from whom they emerge. Legrand was among the first to observe that “the 
European Community has dramatized [the] cognitive disconnections” that 
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exist among, or between, the two principal types of law to be found in the 
European Union, and has made possible a new awareness of the difference 
regarding underlying assumptions that exists.  
 
Only with reference to cultures whose peoples feel that their civil law was 
imposed rather than freely adopted, would it be possible to argue that 
popular culture had not assimilated the rationalist principles of early jurists. 
In the case of France, as well as that of Germany, it has been shown that 
national culture, in the sense that Legrand employs the term, has been 
strongly influenced by the historical processes that led to codification and 
by the daily application of the respective codes over many years. Whether 
the consequences have been wholly benign, and preferable to the ‘customs 
and habits of the people’, Legrand, with his aversion to systematization and 
codification, would doubt. 
 
Conflict resolution and methodology in legal and political culture 
From what we know of the practices of three related peoples of Northern 
Europe  -  the English before the Norman conquest,  the parts of France that 
retained  le droit coutumier under the Ancien Regime, and  the German 
people before and after the Reception of Roman Law by the lower courts in 
the late Middle Ages -  we can deduce that in each society there was a 
contest, of greater or lesser intensity,  between local custom law and Royal 
or Imperial authority. If, following Hegel, we accept that each polity has 
established institutions which reflect the manner in which the Volksgeist of 
each society has been historically conditioned, we can say that the 
characteristic differences lie not in the nature of the contest itself but in the 
manner in which each society resolved, or attempted to resolve, such 
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conflict. As discussed below with reference to what Legrand has to say 
about the form taken by such resolution in England, it is artificial to 
separate the juridical activity from its political and constitutional context. 
 
If there are, as Legrand maintains, “irreducible” differences between the 
Common Law system and Civil Law Systems, these may be more to do 
with methodology than fundamental concepts of justice.  Consistent with 
what Legrand maintains in regard to the different cultures, we would 
expect the manner in which law is conceived and applied to correspond, to 
a large degree, with those political norms, including juridical structures, 
which evolve over time. This is illustrated by the principle of the 
superiority of local law over Imperial law in late mediaeval Germany as 
encapsulated by the aphorism ‘Landrecht bricht Reichsrecht’. Doubtless 
the exponents of Imperial law believed it to be more progressive by the 
standards of the day. That they wished to bring about legal convergence is 
emphasized by Ryan (1962, p.22) who stated that the existence of a custom 
under the Landrecht had to be established beyond reasonable doubt, 
otherwise Imperial law automatically took precedence in the Imperial 
courts. We can be sure that during the era prior to the ‘Reception’ of 
Roman law in the German principalities, and prior to codification in France 
which followed the Revolution, the proposition that customary law  -   
which had constituted the Ius proprium in ancient Rome  -  was something 
to be swept away on the grounds of inconsistency would have been 
vigorously resisted. 
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Coke and contemporary English mentalité:   Legrand’s use of Culture 
  
Under the Civil Law jurisdictions, in contrast to the characteristically 
English constitutional principle that “the executive cannot justify any 
course of action unless it can rely on the conferment of a power by the 
legislature”, there is to be found, Legrand argues (op.cit., p.74), “the notion 
that the government has the inherent power to govern”. In other words the 
dirigisme that characterized the monarchical system of government in 
many parts of Europe until the popular revolutions of 1848 was not 
dissipated by the advent of democratic constitutions.  It becomes 
immediately apparent, therefore, that the prevailing culture to which 
Legrand refers is, at least in part, the prevailing political culture. It may be 
remarked that it would be strange indeed if the executive under a 
constitutional monarchy considered it lacked an inherent right to govern by 
decree in the event of national emergency. It is sometimes forgotten in the 
case of the United Kingdom that there is no legal obligation  -   as distinct 
from political imperative  -  on the government of the day to have treaty 
obligations ratified by the elected chamber once they have been agreed by 
the states concerned. Accordingly we observe that Legrand appears to 
overstate his case in this instance, even to the point of ascribing to the 
British constitution attributes more truly characteristic of the American.  
Nevertheless, the broader point made about legal positivism and culture is 
worth exploring more deeply. In jurisdictions in which the codification of 
law has come to be regarded as normative “everything turns on the 
authority of texts, themselves seen as depending on reason” (ibid., p.74). 
One objection to this state of affairs, as Dicey observed with regard to 
Constitutional Law, is that “rigidity … tends to check gradual innovation” 
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(1939, p.131). However, Legrand’s purpose is to highlight the 
“unexpressed presuppositions which the [Common Law] judge is 
competent to discover” (op. cit., p.72) and to contrast this feature with 
codified texts which embody rules. His point is that such rules, however 
well drafted, cannot be framed to cover every factual situation that might 
arise. Since, as indicated above, this point was made by Portalis himself, it 
appears that Legrand to a certain degree overstates his case. One might add 
that he does not give due weight to the significance of case law in Civilian 
Jurisdictions. However, by drawing attention to this divergence of 
approach, Legrand’s intention is to extrapolate what this connotes with 
reference to political and juridical culture. He quotes (op. cit., p. 80) the 
17
th
 Century jurist Sir Edward Coke in support of his contention regarding 
systemization: “For bringing the common laws into a better method, I 
doubt very much of the fruit of that labour”16. Nevertheless, the fact that 
Coke set down his opinion for posterity suggests that even four centuries 
ago a contrary opinion was expressed from time to time.  
 
Since the early 12
th
 Century it has made sense in reference to England to 
speak of a Common Law interpreted by the judiciary, although for several 
centuries this was exclusively concerned with public law, not private. It is 
in this context that Legrand cites Coke, who became justly famous in 
Constitutional Law   -   and in English history  -   for articulating the 
principle of ‘the rule of law’ in a manner that set a limit to the royal 
pretensions of that era. We are not concerned here with the political aspects 
of the protracted struggle between Crown and Parliament that commenced 
four centuries ago except to note that the adversarial nature of the contest 
                                                 
16
 4 Co. Rep. II at x, ‘To the Reader’, Legrand op.cit. p.80, n.144 
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reflected the manner of trying cases much as politics in modern Britain still 
does. The consequent change in the traditional perception concerning the 
immutability of the Common Law, and the manner in which the subsequent 
practice of the law was affected by the conflict, however, are taken by 
Legrand to be highly relevant to his thesis. He cites (ibid., p.71) Coke’s 
preface to a collection of early 17
th
 Century legal judgments  “[T]he 
grounds of our common laws at this day,” he wrote, “were beyond the 
memory or register of any beginning” (ibid., ftnt.99). That these apparently 
innocuous words are redolent with political significance can be seen in how 
Coke expanded on this theme in a subsequent volume:  “the common law 
of England had been time out of mind before the conquest, and was not 
altered or changed by the Conqueror”17. The phrase ‘time out of mind 
before the conquest’ suggests not an assertion of fact so much as the 
reiteration of what was becoming a national ‘myth’.  While it is true that 
the Norman kings, as we have seen, effectively restated Anglo-Saxon laws 
and customs in laying the basis of the Common Law, Coke’s statement is 
consistent with the widely held belief in the 17
th
 Century that the Anglo-
Saxons had enjoyed numerous freedoms that had been curtailed or 
extinguished by the Norman kings. In the political struggle to retrieve these 
freedoms, whether real or imagined, we see the seeds of the rise of the kind 
of Liberalism which came to dominate British politics.  It is no surprise to 
learn that Coke, and certain other judges who agreed with him, lent their 
support to those in Parliament who sought to prevent the Crown governing 
by Prerogative powers without reference to legislative powers of 
Parliament which had been accorded recognition. In the words of Wade 
(1939, p.lxix): 
                                                 
17
 3 Co. Rep. II at xii, Legrand op.cit. p.72, n. 100 
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The recognition of the legislative powers of Parliament precluded insistence on 
the part of the lawyers that in the Common Law there existed a system of 
fundamental laws which Parliament could not alter but only the judges could 
interpret. The price paid by Coke and his followers … was that the Common 
Law could be changed by Parliament, but by Parliament alone. 
It is for this reason that the principle exists under the rules of Statutory 
Interpretation that there can be no merely implied alteration to the 
Common Law:  any alteration must be express and the defect in the 
Common Law that needs emendation should consequently be stated clearly 
in the Preamble. Likewise, there remains to this day a tendency on the part 
of the judiciary to regard an Act of Parliament as what Latham (1937, 
pp.510-11, cited by Wade op. cit., p.lxix) termed “an interloper on the 
rounded majesty of the Common Law”. The same author concluded: 
[T]he courts show a ripe appreciation of institutions of long standing, whether 
founded by statute or in the common law, but they inhibit themselves from 
seizing the spirit of institutions and situations which are in substance the 
creation of modern legislation. (ibid.) 
Since Common Law judges today may be more open to ‘the spirit of 
institutions’ such as the European Convention on Human Rights, it is 
difficult to assess the contemporary relevance of Latham’s observation, but 
the prevalence of a conservative outlook in the judiciary is not unexpected. 
 
For Legrand, the example of Sir Edward Coke is authority not only for the 
proposition that the English judges have for centuries been doing things 
differently in the courts of law from their Civil Law counterparts, but also 
for the proposition that the mentalité thus engendered has the capacity to 
persist despite a hostile environment. It is submitted that the true picture is 
considerably more subtle than Legrand allows, both in terms of political 
development under the Norman and Plantagenet kings  -  when ancient 
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English usages were formally recognized by the Crown as part of a wider 
political settlement  -  and also in the evolution of English legal practice. 
Canon Law had an umbilical link to Continental jurisprudence by which is 
meant Roman law mitigated by the application of the principles of the New 
Testament. If “the majesty” of the Common Law is indeed “rounded”, as 
Latham averred, there can be little doubt that mediaeval jurists trained in 
Canon Law played their part in the evolution of the Common Law. 
Moreover, although the point was famously made by Lord Eldon in the 
early 19
th
 Century that the Court of Chancery was a court of Law, not of 
Conscience, it remains true that many of the early decisions taken 
nominally by the King in Council were in practice taken by the Lord 
Chancellor a senior churchman who as often as not applied moral rather 
than legal principles to the cases delegated to him (Baker and Langan, 
1982, p.10).  
 
The doctrine of Obligations in Civilian Law is more developed because 
Continental jurists have sought to systematize the law in such a way that 
legal liability follows from an infraction of one of a generic type of duty 
whether in Delict Law or in the Law of Contract. If systematization and 
codification run the risk over time of rendering the law insufficiently 
flexible, it is not as though the Common Law is entirely immune to the 
dangers of mere formalism, as every student of the Common Law soon 
learns. Ever since the confluence of the Common Law and Equity, created 
by the Judicature Act 1873, English judges have been permitted to consider 
equitable remedies in circumstances where the traditional Common Law 
remedy of damages does not suffice. Thus the Constructive Trust could be 
used where one party’s behaviour had been unconscionable, to defeat the 
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injustice wrought by the absence of third party rights under a contract.  
Accordingly we can see that if not the Common Law itself then at least the 
mentalité of its judges has been shaped to a greater or lesser extent by 
doctrines that form part of a common European patrimony. Legrand is 
silent on these questions as he is on the significance or otherwise of the 
mediaeval Ius commune.    
 
While few would deny that there is force in his arguments, Legrand himself 
does not relate them to the question of whether or not the differing 
European perceptions of contractual obligations can be harmonized 
sufficiently so as to give the consumer or business customer greater 
confidence in his or her dealings abroad. Instead we are simply informed 
that the chasm is unbridgeable, the differences irreducible and, in 
consequence, that meaningful convergence not possible. On the narrow 
question of whether rapid progress towards a ‘hard-law’ code is achievable 
within a decade he is right. On the broader question of whether 
convergence is possible at all his case is at best ‘Not Proven’. 
 
Oblique criticism   
Whatever might ultimately prove to be the nature of the proposed ‘optional 
or binding instrument’, Zimmermann (2006 [1], p.574) affirmed his belief 
that the process of the ‘Europeanisation’ of law would continue apace and 
that comparative law would continue to be ‘crucially important’ in this 
process. That Zimmermann’s attitude to historical legal scholarship is 
markedly different to that of Legrand can be inferred from what he says of 
the latter’s attitude to the process just described: 
This is contested only by those who, oddly, equate legal culture essentially with 
national legal culture and who, equally oddly, wish to focus scholarship in 
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comparative law on the investigation (or as it is sometimes put: the celebration) 
of differences in mentality, style or approach. (ibid.) 
For Zimmermann, as for Coing and Savigny before him, the purpose of 
legal scholarship is to fashion means by which to efface differences and 
discrepancies between competing law systems. According to Zimmermann 
the function of historical scholarship is to identify ‘the common ground 
which still exists … as a result of a common tradition, of independent but 
parallel developments, and instances of intellectual stimulation or the 
reception of legal rules or concepts’ (ibid., p.575). Paradoxically these 
words, so heavily redolent of five centuries of legal development in 
Germany, tend not so much to undermine Legrand’s thesis as to confirm 
the essential validity of some of its key propositions.   
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Chapter Four  Good Faith and Jurisprudence        
 
Two developments, one in English law, the other in German appear to lend 
weight to Legrand’s thesis that the Common Law and Civil Law are on 
diverging “trajectories”. Under the former the doctrine of stare decisis is 
considered essential to the maintenance of legal certainty, while under the 
latter, even though von Savigny rejected codification on principle, the 
eventual drafting of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) in the final decade 
of the 19
th
 Century is widely regarded as the crowning achievement of 
more than half a century of ‘legal science’ (Rechtswissenschaft). The 
degree to which the inclusion of good faith and fair dealing within the BGB 
represented a departure from the rigorously Romanizing tendency of 
Savigny and Mommsen will be considered in this chapter. On account of 
its separate development, English law never adopted or developed a 
principle of such general application. In fact there was closer affinity 
between English and German jurists in the mid-19
th
 Century than is 
generally appreciated. This is particularly true with regard to voluntarism 
and the moral responsibility of the individual for contracts freely entered 
into. The desire to see English law founded on principles amenable to 
rationalism, rather than on arcane notions respecting “the breasts of her 
Majesty’s judges”, led first Bentham, and subsequently Austin, to 
conclusions much closer to those of Portalis and his associates in France. 
Thus the era just prior to codification, first in France and a century later in 
Germany, arguably had the greatest potential for finding common positions 
among English and Continental jurists. However, German and English 
scholars approached such problems from different philosophical 
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backgrounds. This chapter will assess whether the background of Hegelian 
positivism and English logical positivism respectively account for the 
differences of approach that remained. It will also endeavour to assess 
whether the intrusion into English law of the principle of good faith and 
fair dealing was necessary in order to achieve the requisite degree of 
harmonization of contract law. Also considered is whether or not good 
faith’s inclusion in the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts regulations 
(UTCCRs) 1993, 1999 will have a benign effect on judicial decision 
making. While the flexible nature of English law may enable it to 
accommodate itself to this principle, as suggested by Lord Bingham in the 
House of Lords’ decision in Director General of Fair Trading v First 
National Bank [2002]  -   the first case in which the UTCCRs were referred 
to  -   it is possible that Civil law jurisdictions will interpret the principle 
more narrowly in future, in a manner consistent with traditional notions of 
‘freedom of contract’18. In such a case the case law authorities on which 
much of English contract law rests would not be fatally undermined by the 
advent of a new doctrine.  
 
In the past good faith has been held up as a principle with potential for 
integrating European legal systems (Zimmermann and Whittaker, 2000). 
The reason why English academic lawyers often maintain a defensive 
attitude is that, unless confined to precisely drafted rules, the doctrine had 
the capacity, in the words of Whittaker (2008, p.24), to trespass on ‘the 
legislative domain’. Whittaker has also characterized as potentially 
“insidious”, particularly for the common lawyer, the manner in which the 
doctrine would be likely to be interpreted under a Draft Common Frame of 
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Reference (2009, p.642). That no common standard has yet been attained is 
largely because of the manner in which the doctrine was included within 
the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994, 1999 leaving 
the judiciary of each jurisdiction free to interpret the principle in 
accordance with national law. 
 
Lord Mansfield ‘s treatment of Good Faith 
In view of Coing’s remarks about the interdependence of English and 
Continental legal systems, discussed in Chapter 2, it is remarkable that no 
reference was made in his paper to the historical significance of Lord 
Mansfield (1705-93), not least because in the 18
th
 Century he tried, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to fuse Common law and Equity (Holdsworth, 1937 p.224). 
As a judge Lord Mansfield was able to apply the principles of Roman law, 
which he had first mastered as a young man at Oxford, in giving judgment 
and, by the expedient of enrolling lay assessors with the necessary 
knowledge of commercial practice and mores, he was responsible for 
settling contemporary English commercial law. That he was able to do so 
without coming into conflict with established authority now seems 
remarkable. In Carter v Boehm (1766) a case concerning unequal access to 
information, Lord Mansfield applied the Civil Law doctrine of good faith
19
. 
However, as is well-known, he did so in a manner which subsequently 
rendered it applicable only in contracts, primarily of insurance, considered 
to be ‘of the utmost good faith’ (uberrimae fidei).  It is evident that Lord 
Mansfield considered the principle of good faith and fair dealing to cover 
pre- as well as post-contractual relations but it is equally evident that the 
duty could not be characterized as all-pervading. In Carter v Boehm Lord 
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Mansfield, with regard to contracts of insurance, drew very distinctly the 
line between behaviour which is ethically acceptable and that which is not: 
Good Faith forbids either party, by concealing what he privately knows, to draw 
the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, and his believing the 
contrary. But either party may be innocently silent, as to grounds open to both, 
to exercise their judgment upon.  
 
Following Lord Mansfield’s lead, English judges construed the principle as 
a pre-contractual duty to inform which existed under circumstances where 
significant circumstances and facts known to a promisee cannot otherwise 
be discovered by the promisor. This distinguishes ‘of the utmost good 
faith’ from ‘good faith and fair dealing’ as a general principle. While it 
may be argued that the two concepts are distinctly different, it could be said 
that contracts under which one party has exclusive access to knowledge 
vital to the interests of the other party form a distinct ‘subset’ under an 
over-arching doctrine of good faith. Whichever analysis is preferred, 
English practitioners are apprehensive lest the intrusion of the Civil Law 
doctrine into English law results in all contracts being treated as if they 
were contracts uberrimae fidei. The possibility of this standard becoming 
universally applicable to commercial transactions was anticipated by 
Goode (1998, p.20) who argued that the doctrine of good faith should not 
be extended to obligations “in respect of which the parties’ interests are 
essentially antagonisitic.” Judicial opinion on the extent of the obligations 
arising from the UTCCRs is discussed below. 
 
Comparative Law scholars with Civil Law backgrounds are apt to infer that 
English judges of the 19th century, lacking Lord Mansfield’s erudition, 
failed to develop for the Common Law a doctrine of good faith consistent 
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with that of the Civil Law tradition, and that the confinement of the 
doctrine very largely to contracts of insurance was the consequence of an 
historically haphazard process of legal development. Writing from from a 
Roman-Dutch law perspective, Du Plessis (2005, p.1) summarized the 
conclusion of Schneider, a German author who endeavoured to chart a 
course for greater approximation of the English and Civil Law standards of 
good faith:   
[T]he need to promote good faith in cases involving unequal access to 
information may require looking beyond the existing uberrimae fidei contracts, 
and also by analogy imposing duties to disclose when dealing with contracts that 
do not fall under this category. By adopting such a course English law would not 
only give renewed recognition to the link identified so long ago by Lord 
Mansfield, but also show that it is much closer to Continental jurisdictions than 
thus far has been appreciated
20
.  
 To “impose duties by analogy” is of course to widen the ambit of uberrima 
fide  -  as much as to say that it is time for Common Law practitioners to 
adapt the definition of good faith in order to approximate it to the standard 
prevalent in Civil Law jurisdictions.  
 
According to Zimmermann and Whittaker (2000, p.58) the ‘potentially 
promising’ nature of good faith in terms of its capacity for furthering legal 
integration in Europe had been raised at a meeting at University of Trento 
in 1994 as a result of Zimmermann’s studies in South Africa into “the way 
in which bona fides and equity had become fused in Roman-Dutch contract 
law” (ibid.). The authors use these terms as part of a shared vocabulary but 
do not advert to the confusion that would result in the mind of anyone who 
assumed that those legal categories have the same connotation under the 
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Common Law as they do in Civil Law jurisdictions, including Roman-
Dutch law. Indeed it is the fact that there a wide spectrum of variation in 
how good faith is interpreted within the Civil Law tradition that presents a 
challenge for contemporary ‘legal science’. In order to appreciate the 
differences it is necessary to understand the divergent interpretations of 
Equity on the Continent and in England.  
 
Fourteenth Century developments 
Gordley (2000, p.95) has indicated that the late-medieval jurists, notably 
Baldus (1327-1406), developed an objective test of good faith under three 
aspects of conduct:  each party should keep his word; neither should take 
advantage by misleading or by driving too harsh a bargain; each should 
abide by obligations an honest person would recognize even if not 
expressly undertaken. The prospect of a juridical world in which the same 
terms of art are employed in jurisdictions with close affinities but which do 
not have an identical meaning thus presents itself. Under the influence of 
jurists who followed Baldus, the Civil Law standard of Equity had been 
defined in Aristotelian terms (Holland op. cit., p.71) and thus to differ 
significantly from what Common Law practitioners have traditionally 
understood. English understanding is strongly influenced by the legacy of 
St Germain’s Doctor and Student, widely studied in the 17th Century, 
which encapsulated the teaching of the late mediaeval scholastics for whom 
questions concerning Equity remained firmly yoked to matters of good 
conscience. Lévy-Ullmann (1935, p.308 f.) cited cases from the 15
th
 
Century Close Rolls indicating that the Chancery Court was known as le 
Court de conscience
21
. Applications for subpoenas at that time invariably 
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included the formulaic expression ‘come la bon foy et conscience 
demandent’ or, alternatively, ‘As good feith and consciens requyren’. If 
good faith subsequently came to be defined in English law as simply the 
absence of mala fides (European Communities Act, 1972, s.9; cf. Walker, 
1980 p.530) this may reflect the determination of Lord Chancellors from 
the late 17
th
 Century onwards to ensure that Chancery was regarded as a 
court of law and that its judgments were neither whimsical nor arbitrary 
(Baker and Langan 1982, p.9). Although there has never been a doctrine of 
good faith and fair dealing in English commercial law, analogous concepts 
of good faith and Equity have remained live principles in cases where there 
has been a fiduciary relationship between the parties. 
 
Unreasonable and unconscionable 
The authors of the Principles of European Contract Law sought to find a 
correlation between good faith and the reasonableness of the reasonable 
person engaged in commerce. It was stipulated that “reasonableness” is ‘to 
be judged by what persons acting in good faith, would consider reasonable’ 
(Article 1: 302). This appears to imply a redefinition of the English test of 
objective reasonableness. In the mind of the European ordinary citizen the 
concepts of acting in good faith and acting reasonably might well be ones 
that cannot readily be understood except in relation to each other. The 
“reasonable man” has been defined by Lando and Beale (2000, p.126) as 
the reasonable person engaged in commercial transactions. Redefinitions of 
this kind produce new problems for, as Whittaker (2008, p.24) notes, “the 
remarkably open-textured nature of good faith” potentially leads to “a very 
considerable degree of legal uncertainty.”  
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It is likely that lack of objective clarity about the ambit of the term ‘good 
faith and fair dealing’, among other legitimate concerns, is what  Lord 
Ackner had in mind in Walford v Miles [1992]  when he described the 
principle  as ‘unworkable in practice’22. Despite the numerous statements to 
the effect that ‘English contract law does not recognize a general concept 
of good faith’ Zimmermann and Whittaker (2000, p.15) concede that the 
position in English law regarding good faith ‘appears to be much less 
unequivocal’ than a continental lawyer might have been led to conclude on 
the basis of his own preconceptions of the modus operandi of the Common 
Law. In Union Eagle Ltd v Golden Achievement Ltd [1997] an otherwise 
straightforward case concerning whether time can be said to be ‘of the 
essence’ of a contract, an attempt was made to correlate unreasonableness 
and “unconscionable behaviour”23. The claimant had argued that the non-
acceptance of a tender ten minutes after the passing of a previously 
stipulated deadline was ‘unconscionable’. The intention was to persuade 
the English bench to accept that the expressions unconscionable and 
unreasonable could in the particular context be treated as synonyms and 
thus to realign what constitutes ‘unconscionable’ behaviour with a concept 
of unfairness based on grounds of ‘lack of reasonableness.’ 
 
In discussing the English and German approaches to pre-contractual 
obligations, it was stressed by Sims (2003, p.171), that the concept of good 
faith is apt to confuse those who understand it merely as reflecting a 
subjective state of mind of an individual  -  such as the purchaser of goods 
with or without knowledge of whether they had been dishonestly 
appropriated by the vendor  -  rather than as an objective term. She 
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paraphrased a leading German case which described good faith under §242 
of the BGB as a “sophisticated legal-ethical concept” which “constitutes 
grounds for a legal intervention under circumstances whereby such a 
fundamental change has overtaken the post-contractual position of the 
parties that it would be inconsistent with the principles of justice to hold 
the aggrieved party to the contract” (Sims op. cit., p.14)24. It is only 
comparatively recently that the question concerning the degree to which 
good faith poses an opportunity for, or a threat to, closer legal integration 
has been addressed.  
 
Historical perspectives 
In the year that the United Kingdom became a member state of the 
European Community it was strongly implied by Coing (1973, p.517) that 
under the terms of the Treaty of Rome the time had come for English legal 
concepts to be approximated to the traditions of its Common Market 
partners with the ultimate goal of creating a United Europe. He observed 
that, despite the characteristic differences that separate the Common Law 
and the Civil Law jurisdictions, there had always “in the course of 
centuries been give and take from [England] to the Continent and vice 
versa” (ibid., p. 516). Indeed the early 19th Century has been described as 
“a critical period” during which “a partial reception of ideas derived from 
the civil law of continental Europe” was incorporated in to English legal 
thought (Simpson 1986, p.12). When rationalists of the Natural Law school 
in France had completed the Code Civil, Pothier’s Treatise on the Law of 
Obligations (1761- 4) became highly influential, one High Court judge 
declaring the authority of an early 19
th
 Century translation of the French 
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jurist’s treatise into English to be ‘as high as can be had, next to a decision 
of a court of justice in this country’ (ibid. p.17). England and the Civil Law 
jurisdictions were evidently quite close during this era regarding the 
judicial consideration of academic authority. Thus Tindal, CJ: 
The Roman law forms no rule binding in itself on the subjects of these realms, 
but in deciding a case upon principle, where no direct authority can be cited 
from our books, it affords no small evidence of the soundness of the conclusion 
by that law  -  the fruit of the researches of the most learned men, the collective 
wisdom ages, and the groundwork of the Municipal law of most of the countries 
of Europe
25
.  
 
Voluntarism and Utilitarianism 
It may also be noted that many of the ideas expressed by Pothier regarding 
the principle of consensus ad idem, especially the union of the two wills, 
are to be found also in the writings of Savigny, one of the founders of the 
Historical, as distinct from the Natural Law, school of jurisprudence. While 
Savigny believed that Law has its existence in the ‘general will’ 
(Gesammtwille), he argued that “customary observance is not the cause of 
Law but the evidence of its existence”. (Savigny, System i.16, cited in 
Holland op. cit., p.262 ). This may be contrasted with the characteristic 
English view, based on historical development rather than abstract 
reasoning, which is that what begins as custom gradually acquires the force 
of law by being formally recognized as such. 
During the 19
th
 Century both English and German courts recognized the 
importance of upholding decisions solemnly entered into by natural and 
legal persons. Sir Thomas Holland’s analysis, perhaps unintentionally, 
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revealed the differences in philosophical orientation underpinning German 
law. He found that the doctrine of the agreement of the wills, as defined by 
Savigny, however well-grounded it might be in the German philosophical 
tradition, is not entirely logically consistent. Holland posed the 
hypothetical question of a contract, one of the parties to which induced the 
other party to enter into legal relations while resolved at all times not to 
perform his part under it. Since commentators would universally agree that 
the agreement should have legal effect, Holland inferred that it is the will 
as expressed by one party to the other that in fact constitutes the contract 
(op. cit., p. 262).  He was able to cite Langdell in support of his contention: 
“Mental acts, or acts of the will, are not the materials out of which 
promises are made. A physical act on the part of the promisor is 
indispensable”26  
The legal traditions of European countries such as France and Sweden 
reflect the prevailing philosophical tendency during the centuries since the 
rise of the Natural Law school of jurisprudence. In the case of Germany, 
although the BGB was ultimately to owe much to the German 
philosophical tradition as well as Roman law precepts, opinion was 
divided. According to Kantorowicz (1937, p.334), in a lecture entitled 
Rechtsphilosophie, delivered in 1821, Hegel attacked Savigny for his 
Romanizing policy which he considered a national insult. The philosopher, 
recognizing that Savigny was engaged in the skilful engrafting of a foreign 
legal system, would have preferred national law to have embodied the 
principles of traditional custom law as had been advocated by Thibaut in 
1814. 
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The principle of Utility, the greatest happiness for the greatest number, by 
its very nature required practical application and it may be for this reason 
that it became the guiding principle informing politics, law reform and 
penal reform in 19
th
 Century England. Utilitarianism associated with 
Bentham, James Mill and J.S. Mill is regarded as one of the principal 
recent British contributions to Western philosophy. The following doctrine, 
as expressed by J.S. Mill (1866, p.480) was widely held in 19
th
 Century 
Britain: 
governments ought to confine themselves to affording protection against force 
and fraud:  that, these two things apart, people should be free agents, able to take 
care of themselves, and that so long as a person practises no violence or 
deception to the injury of others in person or property, legislatures and 
governments are in no way called on to concern themselves about him  
In fact Mill regarded the limited protection in respect of violence and fraud 
as not strictly logical and that this limitation has arisen simply because “the 
expediency is more obvious” (ibid., p.482). Nevertheless such opinion was, 
and remains, broadly characteristic of the ‘classical’ liberal on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Continental jurists do not always appreciate, even today, that  
the presence or absence of an element of the kind of deception, or fraud, 
alluded to by Mill strongly colours the distinctively English notions of 
what constitutes bad faith or good faith. However, this is in the process of 
undergoing change. Lord Bingham averred that Reg. 4(1) of the Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 “lays down a composite 
test covering both the making and substance of the contract, and must be 
applied bearing clearly in mind the objective which the regulations are 
designed to promote.”  These he characterized in Director General of Fair 
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Trading v First National Bank [2002] as “good standards of morality and 
practice”27. 
 
Contemporary influence of Civil Law 
If each jurisdiction within the European Union were left to define good 
faith with reference to the prevailing business mores, an English definition 
of good faith would be significantly different from that in most Civil Law 
jurisdictions. However, counter-intuitive as it may seem, part of the effect 
of the UTCCRs is to compel English judges to apply a standard of good 
faith closer to that of the Civil Law because an analogous English doctrine 
to good faith and fair dealing has never been enunciated. In a previous case 
Lord Bingham had insisted that “English law has characteristically …  
developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of 
unfairness” Interfoto Picture Library v Stilletto Visual Programmes Ltd 
[1989]
28
.  Prior to the Directive 93/13/EC, to which the Regulations give 
effect, Lord Bingham was not alone in allowing the distinctive English 
approach to co-exist with, and gradually approximate itself to, Civil Law 
standards without the necessity of adopting or formulating a distinctive 
legal doctrine. Lord Denning (op. cit., p.175) expressed satisfaction that 
Parliament had undertaken to give the consumer adequate protection from 
disadvantageous contract terms imposed by the economically stronger 
party, thereby obviating the need for the narrow construction of  contract 
terms on the part of judges in order to reach conclusions that concur with 
their own notions of justice. Accordingly he was quite sanguine about the 
‘incoming tide’ of legislation initiated in the European Union which tended 
in the same direction. Other judges have been less so. The year before the 
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directive which effectively ‘implanted’ the Civil Law concept of good faith 
in English law, Lord Ackner declared the doctrine of good faith and fair 
dealing to be “inherently repugnant” to the traditionally adversarial 
position adopted by the Anglo-Saxon man, or woman, of business engaged 
in commercial negotiations Walford v Miles [1992]
29
.  This attitude has 
been criticized by Sims (op. cit., p.167) in terms that make plain the 
different approaches to contract making that exist under the Common Law 
and within jurisdictions which recognize the principle of good faith: “This 
assessment of the contractual relationship, she states: 
makes the fundamental error of regarding contracts as essentially short-term 
exchanges, where the sought after benefit is obtained almost instantaneously 
(sic), and the potentially negative side effects of purely self-interested behaviour 
do not matter … Where parties are engaged in continued reaction, their overall 
conduct is therefore likely to be conciliatory rather than adversarial; a fact which 
is reflected in good faith-based duties … but not in a purely antagonistic view of 
contract.  
 
According to Zimmermann and Whittaker (2000, p.218) there is another 
dimension to good faith and fair dealing to which Sims does not allude. 
“[G]ood faith is used to deter or to sanction (sic) certain behaviour in the 
formation of a contract which is considered socially unacceptable by the 
law”  -  the context making it clear that ‘prohibit’ rather than ‘permit’ is 
meant. Accordingly, a virtue is made of creating a degree of uncertainty in 
the mind of anyone considering following an ethically questionable course 
of action. Musy (2001, p.5) characterized the position under English law 
thus:  the courts, when confronted by a party claiming “a breach of good 
faith duties”, have been said to offer remedies but to prefer to do so 
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“without referring to a general principle [of good faith], which apparently 
seems to create a problem regarding the predictability of the legal outcomes 
of cases”. He does not allude to other considerations, such as the moral 
responsibility of each person for his or her own actions, which were 
deemed paramount at the time that the ‘classical’ doctrine evolved. 
The moral context of freedom of contract 
By the late 19
th
 Century the doctrine of freedom of contract under the 
Common Law had become well-established. In the words of Sir George 
Jessel MR 
If there is one thing more than another which public policy requires it is that 
men of mature age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty in 
contracting, and that their contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, 
shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of Justice
30
.  
The public policy elements in High Court judgments were developed in 
response to the increasing volume of litigation as a consequence of the 
industrial revolution and demographic trends. Such elements, characterized 
as ‘formalism’ by Atiyah (1979, p.388), were derived from what Simpson 
(op. cit. p.14) described as the ‘fashionable theories of the political 
economists’ of the 19th Century. ‘Plainly,’ writes Atiyah, ‘the growth of 
formalism was closely related to the ideas of the political economists and to 
the rise of the market economy’ (op. cit. p.389). The philosophical ideas of 
David Ricardo (1772-1823), author of ‘On the Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation’ (1817), had led to friendship with Bentham and 
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James Mill.  Their ideas in turn were associated with those of John Austin, 
mentioned in Chapter 3, who was an advocate of the codification of the 
Common Law who for a time held the chair of Jurisprudence at University 
College London (Atiyah op. cit., p.372).  
Notwithstanding the fact that the leading German legal scholars had 
discovered that the prior arrangement by Roman juristae of the Justinian 
Corpus iuris greatly facilitated their attempts to create a ‘legal science’ it is 
clear from the pages of Holland’s Jurisprudence, published a decade before 
the BGB was completed, that a sympathetic relationship had developed 
between English and German legal scholarship between 1820 and 1850.  
As previously discussed, in German thought such obligations as arose did 
so on the basis of a strongly ‘voluntarist’ doctrine, the essence of a binding 
agreement being characterized as the convergence of the contracting 
parties’ wills. In Savigny’s words “they must definitely have intended one 
thing or another and, in fact, both the same thing” (“sie müssen irgend 
etwas, und zwar Beide dasselbe, bestimmt gewollt haben “ (Holland op. cit. 
262)”. Atiyah (op. cit., p.407) points out that it was not unknown for this 
‘Rousseau-like language’ consciously to be echoed by English judges. It 
seems appropriate to endeavour to ascertain what part, if any, was played 
by the doctrine of good faith in relation to this doctrine of the two wills.  
The absence of good faith at the pre-contractual stage on the part of one or 
other of the parties may be classified as behaviour that so impinges on the 
will of the party not at fault that it would not be just and right to insist that 
the latter remained bound by his undertakings. This seems to be the 
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rationale of the UTCCRs which was summarized by Lord Bingham in 
Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank [2002]
31
. 
Fair dealing requires that a supplier should not, whether deliberately or 
unconsciously, take advantage of the consumer's necessity, indigence, lack of 
experience, unfamiliarity with the subject matter of the contract, weak 
bargaining position or any other factor listed in or analogous to those listed in 
Schedule 2 of the regulations. 
Holland, however, did not devote space to a discussion of the place of good 
faith and fair dealing. The closest that he came to acknowledging the 
existence in the Civil Law jurisdictions of such a duty, even if only in 
embryonic form, is contained in the following:   
Partly under the influence of the Canon Law, partly from the strong sense of the 
obligation of a promise characteristic of the Teutonic races, the nations of the 
continent early ignored the narrow definition of ‘causa’ and the distinctions 
between ‘contractus’ and ‘nuda pacta’ which they found in the writings of the 
Roman lawyers. (op. cit., p 284) 
Accordingly, it may be inferred that good faith had no substantial position 
in the Corpus iuris that Savigny so admired. The only possible exception 
was under the Praetorian code but this was discretionary and only operated 
where the Lex could not resolve a case. It is likely that good faith played 
only a subordinate role in 19
th
 Century ‘legal science’ in Germany because, 
as implied by Holland, the Hellenistic origins of the principle found their 
counterpart in the Germanic customary law  -  championed by Thibaut and 
others of the Natural Law school  -   which took root in Northern Europe 
following the demise of the Roman Empire in the West. 
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Although editions of Holland published after 1900 made reference to the 
German code, and to those of other nations, there was no systematic 
attempt to assess the combined impact of Roman law and of the Canon law 
on the law codes of the modern era. In view of the scant treatment accorded 
by Holland to good faith, one infers that he considered it to be merely 
derivative and not a primary source of either ancient or contemporary 
jurisprudence. Indeed, it may plausibly be argued that the inclusion of Treu 
und Glauben in the BGB was merely adventitious. 
 
Good Faith as a Catalyst for Harmonization 
The lack of a general principle of good faith and fair dealing in English 
law, taken together with the irrelevance, generally speaking, of whether a 
breach of contract is intentional or not, have been said to:  
reflect English law’s focus on large scale commercial transactions, made by 
hard-nosed traders dealing at arm’s length. But whatever forms the background 
to these attitudes, taken at face value, it would seem that the making, performing 
or breaking of contracts is conducted in a context which is permitted by the law 
to be nasty and brutish, the parties being entitled to flout all considerations of 
decency and fair play.” (Zimmerman and Whittaker op. cit., p.41.) 
 
Within this particular analysis there is the implication that there should be a 
closer approximation between morality and legality than has been 
traditional in England and Wales. It does not follow that because the 
English legal system traditionally refused relief except in contracts 
uberrimae fidei that the mores on which that system it is based condones 
behaviour that is, in the Hobbesian phrase, “nasty and brutish”.  An 
alternative account of the position under English law a generation ago is 
given by Baker and Langan (op. cit., p.540) with reference to the decision 
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in Fry v Lane [1886-90]
32
 which was applied in Lloyd’s Bank v Bundy 
[1975]
33
  
The relationship of banker and customer is … in general an ordinary and 
commercial one: but special circumstances such as the age and financial 
embarrassment of the customer, may operate to impose a fiduciary duty upon the 
bank in its dealings with him. 
 
Equitable relief may be granted if a fiduciary relationship could reasonably 
be construed so that the doctrine of undue influence might be applied. This 
was the approach taken by Lord Denning MR (Bradgate 1995, p.562) even 
if the House of Lords subsequently rejected as too uncertain his assertion of 
a judicial power of intervention whenever there was inequality of 
bargaining power (ibid. p.36). Although the bank’s representative “acted in 
the utmost good faith and was straightforward and genuine” (Lloyd’s Bank 
v Bundy [1975] p.766), ultimately the “grossly inadequate” consideration 
proved decisive to the outcome of the case. In this context Lord Denning’s 
definition of an ‘unconscionable transaction’ is significant. This is said to 
occur where the weaker party 
is so placed as to be in need of special care and protection and yet his weakness 
is exploited by another far stronger than himself so as to get his property at a 
gross undervalue (ibid. 763) 
 
Perhaps sensing that the increasing influence of Civil Law might allow the 
bands of authority represented by English case law to be loosened, Lord 
Denning insisted in Siskina (Cargo Holders) v Distos Compania Naviera 
SA [1979] “Now that we are in the Common Market it is our duty to do our 
part in harmonizing the laws of the countries of the Nine … It is our duty to 
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apply the Treaty according to the spirit and not the letter”34. This approach 
was refuted on appeal as allowing too wide a discretion, Lord Diplock 
insisting that, by virtue of Art. 100 of the Treaty of Rome, laws were to be 
harmonized solely by means of directives issued following a proposal of 
the Commission; he maintained that there was “little encouragement” in 
Art 100 “for judges of national courts to jump the gun by introducing their 
own notions of what would be suitable harmonization”35.  In fact as 
Fletcher (1982, p.63) points out, in Case 71/76 Thieffry v Conseil de 
l’Ordre des Avocats a la Cour de Paris [1977] this approach had already 
been shown to be not in accord with the Court of Justice’s ‘teleological’ 
role in fostering the realization of the goals of the EU’s founders36. Lord 
Diplock’s disapprobation of judicial activism with regard to legal 
harmonization under the Treaty meant that during the 18 years that elapsed 
between Bundy and the issuing of Directive 13/93/EC, it was not possible 
for a distinctively English doctrine of good faith and fair dealing to be 
articulated.  
 
Lord Bingham’s dicta in D-G of Fair Trading v First National Bank [2002] 
seem prima facie to be the routine implementation of regulations pursuant 
to a Directive in the manner approved by Lord Diplock
37
. Doubtless 
comfort could be drawn from the American experience in the last century. 
There, where the Restatement (Second) of Contracts paragraph 205 states 
“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in its performance and enforcement”, good faith has become an aid 
to the construction of a contract. Weigand (2004, p.184) states that the 
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adoption of the principle of good faith in the Uniform Commercial Code 
has not had the effect of creating a new cause of action in the event of 
failure either to perform or to enforce a contract in good faith. Instead 
contracts are interpreted by the courts within their commercial contexts, 
and good faith and fair dealing assist in deciding whether one or more of 
the terms of the contract itself has been breached.  It is submitted that in 
regard to pre-contractual duties, English courts are likely to be wary of 
extending the doctrine of good faith. However, in the prevailing English 
and European context, the omission of any reference in the Regulations to 
the need to have due regard to customary business practice (the meaning of 
Verkehrsitte in BGB §242) further enhances the position of the consumer.  
 
Reticence and fraud 
“Simple reticence does not amount to legal fraud however it may be 
viewed by moralists”: thus was the Common Law position during the 
second half of the 19
th
 Century summed up by Lord Campbell in Walters v 
Morgan (1861)
38
.  The statement needs qualification for it is not applicable 
if a false statement is made in ignorance of the fact that it was false, and the 
maker subsequently learns his mistake but he elects to keep silent. This was 
the decision in With v O’Flanagan [1936]39 which followed the judgment 
of Fry J in Davies v London Provincial Marine Insurance Co (1878)
40
. 
Nevertheless, in commercial contracts, the traditional position  -  according 
to Lord Campbell in Walters v Morgan (supra) in words which echo Lord 
Mansfield’s judgment in Carter v. Boehm (1766)  -   has been that as long 
as there is “no fiduciary relationship between vendor and purchaser, the 
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purchaser is not bound to disclose any fact not exclusively with in his 
knowledge which might be reasonably be expected to influence the price of 
the subject to be sold.”  
 
Following judgment in the Poussin case
41
 in which an art expert from the 
Louvre kept silent about a wrongly attributed painting at an auction prior to 
sale, thereafter asserting the State’s right to acquire the piece at the auction 
price, certain academic writers in France revealed that they were rather 
closer to the position taken by Lord Campbell than they were to that of the 
Cour de Cassation whose task it had been to interpret the ambit of bonne 
foi under the Code Civil.  Such cases are significant in that they stand in 
contrast to the language of Hesselink (2004, p.497) who argues simply  
the concept of good faith in itself should not keep common law and civil law 
lawyers divided. … The adoption of a general good faith clause in itself does not 
say anything about which rules will speak through its mouth. Good faith does 
not differ much from what the English lawyers have experienced with equity. 
The real question is whether the rules adopted by the courts mentioning good 
faith should be included in a European code or restatement. 
Hesselink’s assessment is optimistic. With reference to judicial practice in 
Germany, it has been pointed out by Sims (op. cit., p.16) that numerous 
commentators believe that the operation of the good faith principle under 
§242 BGB allows judges to evade proper analysis of individual cases, and 
that at times the principle  – 
has degenerated to little more than judicial window dressing tagged on to every 
judgement as if mere citation of §242 can lend credence to any analysis, any 
solution. 
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Reaching a Consensus 
Since different societies, and their legislatures, have different conceptions 
of what business practices are socially unacceptable the Court of Justice 
has refused to force the pace of harmonization in this area by imposing a 
single standard, preferring to allow good faith to continue to have different 
nuances of meaning in different Member States. More frequent reference to 
the principle of good faith can be expected on the part of the English bench 
in the future. Nonetheless, if what Musy avers (op. cit. p.5) is true, then 
there is an argument for a gradualist approach as regards the Common Law 
jurisdiction since good faith’s detractors not unreasonably fear that the 
implantation of such a source of legal uncertainty would have 
unforeseeable consequences in the short to medium term. However, with 
the anticipated increase in the number of cross-border transactions in 
accordance with the Common European Sales Terms, it is possible that 
Europeans will arrive sooner rather than later at a consensus on what forms 
of malpractice in business warrant ‘judicial interference’ and legal or 
financial redress. As the Utilitarian J.S. Mill observed more than a century 
ago  - 
There is a multitude of cases in which governments, with general approbation, 
assume powers and execute functions for which no reason can be assigned 
except the simple one, that they conduce to general convenience (op. cit. p.482). 
 
Under conditions of liberal democracy perhaps the expression ‘with 
general approbation’ deserves emphasis. European legislatures can be 
expected to operate in the manner described by Mill whenever traditional 
business mores are not adequate to meet the needs or expectations of the 
present. If this leads to progressively greater legal certainty among 
economic actors in the European Union, one of the reasons traditionally 
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given for the approximation of law among the Member States will have 
been realized.   
___________________ 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five      
 
The Evolution of Thought Within the Commission 
 
In the absence of reliable empirical evidence on the desirability of a more 
integrated European private law it is not difficult to detect an almost 
palpable sense of relief in the manner in which Staudenmayer (2006, 
p.235), the chairman of the group overseeing the Commission’s three 
Communications since 2000, greeted the results of a questionnaire by the 
law firm Clifford Chance. The immediate question that arises, however, is 
what the surprising dearth of comparable evidence, collated by or on behalf 
of the Commission, tells us about its attitude over the years to the whole 
question of the harmonization of Contract Law. Evidently the Commission 
believed for many years that it had no need to produce hard evidence in 
support of its contentions. The evidence adduced by Eurobarometer (320 
and 321) about transaction costs incurred by SMEs in the absence of a 
European sales law (CESL) is open to question, as is the Commission’s 
assumption that the effects of other factors inhibiting trade, such as 
differences in language and business mores do not need to be addressed 
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with the same urgency as differences concerning the formation and 
termination of contract. 
 
The architects of the PECL cannot have intended simply that their work 
should provide a starting point for an optional instrument but rather that in 
its totality it should form the “basis for judicial and arbitral interpretation of 
private transactions” (Lando 2000, p.59)  Such an ambition can only be 
realized in one of three ways:  firstly, through a process by which the 
Member States voluntarily adopt a set of rules by enacting an international 
treaty, secondly by selective adaptation over time (much criticized by some 
for being a ‘piecemeal’ approach) or, thirdly, by a gradual process of 
harmonization through the judicial process. Since the Commission has not 
revealed a decided preference for the first of these, which would constitute 
a ‘hard law’ approach, it must be inferred that it prefers, at least for the 
time being, the ‘soft law’ approach implicit in the other two as a means of 
attaining the desired end of what the European Commission (2003) termed 
a ‘more coherent’ European contract law. Since there is an ever-present 
risk of a drawn out process of judicial harmonization losing momentum 
altogether, it might have been expected that the Commission would favour 
the hard law approach. However, the policy of ‘harmonization by directive’ 
was found to be unsatisfactory (Whittaker 2009, p.616, 2012, p.579), the 
EU Commission itself noting that “significant variations between national 
implementing measures” led to their being inconsistently applied (COM 
(2003) 68 final at p.27; Biukovic, 2008, p.288).  Frustrated in its initial 
policy, the Commission turned its attention to the approximation of 
consumer protection provisions.  
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The drafting of the proposed CESL, discussed below, provided a further 
opportunity to incorporate all the best aspects of the disparate legal 
traditions of the member states. CESL Recital (12) insists that “there will 
be no disparities between the laws of the member states in this area where 
the parties have chosen to use [CESL]” and that, in consequence, Article 
6(2) of the Rome I Regulation, “has no practical importance for the issues 
covered by the Common European Sales Law”.  Article 6(2), which 
equates to Art. 5(2) of the Rome I Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG), ensures that a consumer habitually resident in another 
country is not put in the position of losing the protection of that country’s 
consumer protection provisions if the standard should happen to be higher 
where he or she resides. The American commentators Bar-Gill and Ben-
Shahar (2012, p.2) observe that, an unforeseen consequence has been that 
the freedom to choose an inferior standard of consumer protection in return 
for a discount on the price, has been extinguished.  
 
As a culmination of the Commission’s deliberations since it became aware 
a decade ago that there was unlikely to be sufficient support for the 
promulgation of a European Civil Code, the CESL constitutes primary 
evidence for the evolution of the Commission’s thought in recent years. 
References to the CESL in this chapter will be included insofar as they 
shed light on this, and on the status of the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference. Whittaker (2012, p.599) concluded that the CESL imposed so 
onerous a burden of pre-contractual disclosure on the ‘trader’  -  i.e. the 
business in a ‘business-to-consumer (B2C) contract) as to render ‘not very 
promising’ the chances, or likelihood, of the CESL coming to be regarded 
as standard European terms. However, this is to consider the CESL 
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principally in terms of cross-border trade with in the EU. Whittaker’s 
criticisms certainly seem justified if it is accepted that a certain narrowness 
of thinking was displayed on the part of those within the Commission who 
had hoped to see the promulgation of a European Civil Code by 2010. This 
notwithstanding, an attempt will be made in what follows to consider the 
CESL in the wider context of global trade and to assess whether there are 
grounds for optimism. Since this is best understood in the light of the 
Commission’s policy at the time of the passing of the Single European Act, 
it is appropriate to consider the evolution of thought within the 
Commission over a generation.   
 
International conventions 
In its Communication of 2001 the Commission stated that it was 
interested in gathering information on the need for wider-reaching Community 
action in the area of contract law, in particular to the extent that the case-by-case 
approach might not be able to solve all the problems which might arise. 
These words suggest that the Commission saw the need for a bolder 
approach to the question but was not prepared to act against the consensus 
of opinion among those most closely interested in the matter. This position 
was taken notwithstanding their estimation of the published works on the 
law of contract, of tort and property law of the Trento Common Core 
Project which “would provide a useful foundation” for a European Civil 
Code (ibid.) 
 
In the eyes of the Commission, if a mandatory set of agreed European 
contract law terms could succeed in fostering a distinctive European 
identity in the market place, it would have much to commend it since it 
would harmonize well with the existing acquis and offer uniform 
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protection to all consumers within the member states. The comparable but 
less far-reaching set of rules adopted by the Rome I Regulation, which 
represents ‘standard terms’ in signatory countries unless the parties opt to 
exclude its provisions, have established the concept of an optional 
instrument as the standard by which any European contract law terms 
would be judged. Article 6(2) of the Regulation, which, as noted by Bar-
Gill and Ben-Shahar (2012) implicitly recognizes the existence of different 
standards of consumer protection among signatory countries, preserves this 
choice for parties continuing to contract under the terms of the Convention.  
 
From the European Commission’s perspective, a significant defect of the 
CISG provisions adopted under the Regulation is that they do not apply to 
contracts made by means of electronic communication, a form of economic 
activity that Commission has been anxious to encourage. The original 
Convention articles appear to have been drafted principally with business-
to business contracts in contemplation. Where parity of bargaining power 
between the parties is deemed to exist many of the safeguards put in place 
for the consumer are not applicable. The greater emphasis on the 
importance of business to consumer contracts, and those between large 
businesses and SMEs, provided an opportunity for a distinctly European 
legal instrument to be drafted without fear that it would be made redundant 
by the continued operation of the CISG. Until 2009 the United Kingdom’s 
position was that it intended to ratify the convention “subject to the 
availability of Parliamentary time” (Hansard, 2005). That this had never 
been a priority suggests that the status quo benefited certain vested 
interests. Should contracting parties conclude that the enhanced consumer 
protection under the proposed regulation for a Common European Sales 
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Law (CESL) would be disadvantageous, the choice of law provision 
enshrined in the Rome I Regulation would still suffice.  
 
Political Considerations of the Commission   
The wider context of such provisions for the protection of the consumer is 
discussed below. In order to understand the significance of the recent 
emphasis by the Commission on accomplishing identifiable aims, it is 
necessary briefly to consider the changes that have taken place since 1980.  
The Single European Act, which came into effect in January 1987, was 
expected by Jacques Delors, then Commission President, to become “the 
economic and social cornerstone of European revival after years of 
stagnation” (Delors,1986). In the course of a speech given to mark 10th 
Anniversary of European University Institute, he identified a number of 
barriers   -  “physical, technical and tax”  -   to economic and technical 
integration (ibid.). If the progressive approximation of legal systems is 
what Delors had in mind, the phraseology chosen would seem to have been 
an oblique way of advocating it. Significantly perhaps, ‘harmonization’ of 
“Community policies and instruments” is specifically referred to only in 
the final paragraph of his speech.  Delors also stated that nothing of what 
he outlined would be achievable without the Commission acquiring certain 
powers of implementation which, he insisted, “it must be given” (ibid.).  
By January 1987 the European Community had increased since its 
inception from six to twelve member states. Subsequently Delors realized 
that in the wake of the political events of 1989, with European Community 
attention turned towards the East, it could more than double again, as it has. 
In consequence national leaders were presented with the political difficulty 
of reconciling domestic opinion to such an expansion, for a European 
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Community that spreads its boughs wider must of necessity have 
institutional roots that go down deeper and are correspondingly stronger. 
Naturally enough there were calls for a reinvigorated campaign to make a 
European ‘law of obligations’, comprising both contract and tort by virtue 
of the Rome I and Rome II Conventions, a reality. 
 
The New Poverty  
During his speech Delors also considered that the economic and technical 
integration of the European Community should be secondary to the 
European Parliament’s project for political union advanced at that time. 
However, the Commission concentrated its efforts on certain social and 
quasi-political aspects of the high earning, high spending economy that 
characterized the era which ended dramatically in 2008. At the same time 
the problem of the long-term unemployed, which Delors alluded to as ‘the 
new poverty’ (ibid.), proved intractable. In view of the continuing 
difficulties in the Eurozone economic area the Commission insists on 
having a role, in addition to that of government at the national level, in 
combating it. These considerations represent the broad political 
background to the increased focus on the approximation of national laws, 
the lowering of barriers to trade and the quest for an acceptable ‘optional 
instrument’. To postulate a timid disposition on the part of the Commission 
is not an adequate explanation for the fact that it preferred to follow a 
tentative approach. Rather, its discretion may be connected with, firstly, the 
correct interpretation of the Commission’s powers under the TFEU and, 
secondly, with the priority the Commission has given to strengthening the 
Acquis communautaire with regard to protecting the interests of the 
consumer.  
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Consumer Protection today 
If the plans for a Europe-wide Civil Code came to be seen as something 
abstracted from the day to day concerns of Europe’s peoples, it is largely 
because the question of the convergence of European Law, in particular the 
Law of Contract, has become an adjunct of the Commission’s policy of 
taking its ad hoc provisions for the benefit of the consumer and recasting 
them for inclusion in an improved Acquis communautaire. It is not 
immediately apparent whether this has been understood as an end in itself 
or whether it would serve as a model for further far-reaching reform of that 
body of law overseen by the CJEU. The Commission’s approach was 
summarized by a former Commissioner for Consumer Affairs – 
In today’s Europe the law is seen as means to empower, where in the past it 
tended to be viewed predominantly as a means to prevent. For the European 
Commission better regulation is at the heart of our work. So in looking at the 
modernization of European consumer law, we need to build consumer trust 
through effective and relevant laws underpinning consumer rights, and we need 
to simplify the legal environment for business to ensure a proportionate single 
set of rules for a single retail market. This involves a fundamental overhaul of 
consumer law from commercial practices to consumer contracts. (Kuneva, 
2008). 
 
The natural inference to draw from these remarks is that the harmonization 
of contract law in Europe should take place only within the context of the 
revision of the efficacy of the directives for consumer protection that have 
been issued over the last quarter of a century. The emphasis on such 
considerations reflects the impact of the Court of Justice’s interpretation of 
TEC Art 95 in the Tobacco Advertising judgments (Germany v. Council 
and Parliament 2000; 2006), discussed below, by which the Commission 
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learnt that it lacks anything approaching a general power to enhance the 
internal market.  It is likely that the constitutional considerations raised by 
these judgments account, either in full or in part, for the hesitant approach 
to the whole question of harmonization since the European Council 
meeting at Tampere, Finland in 1999 when it had given fresh impetus to 
the quest for the elimination of ‘obstacles to the good functioning’ of civil 
proceedings
42
. The Commission’s three successive Communications 
regarding a common European contract law in 2001, 2003 and 2004 were 
genuinely consultative in purpose. Having consulted with stakeholders 
following the first, the Commission indicated ‘the way forward’ with the 
last. The ‘interim communication’ of 2003, commonly referred to as ‘the 
Action Plan’ (Council Report, COM 2003), contained plans to establish a 
template  -  i.e. the Common Frame of Reference  -  to serve as a model for 
the future, and the observation that:  
Only through continuous involvement of all Community institutions and all 
stakeholders can it be ensured that the final outcome of this process will meet 
the practical needs of all economic operators involved and finally be accepted by 
all concerned. For this reason, the Commission has decided to submit the 
present Action Plan as a basis for further consultation.  
Moreover, the Commission indicated that its immediate ambition was in 
fact limited in scope:  “The creation of a common frame of reference is an 
intermediate step towards improving the quality of the EC ‘acquis’ in the 
area of contract law.” (ibid. -  emphasis added). 
 
Consumer Protection and the Draft Common Frame of Reference 
A significant number of initiatives in favour of consumer protection 
appeared at the behest of the Commission during the years 2001 - 2007.  
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The Consumer Protection Green Paper (2001) - by definition a 
consultative measure  -  was published a decade after the ‘Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations’, which had taken a decade 
to negotiate, came into force. However, in 2006-7 the publication of a 
further Green Paper, in which the consolidation of no fewer than eight 
Directives was proposed, signalled that the Commission had embarked on a 
policy of establishing consumer protection as a priority for the European 
Union. The fact that this policy was not pursued in tandem with the 
preparation for publication of the Draft CFR suggests that the Commission 
had no desire to see either project unduly delayed. In spite of this, the 
Commission’s stance regarding consumer protection lacked transparency. 
The laconic remark that ‘relevant CFR findings will be incorporated into 
the EU consumer contract law review’ (European Commission 2007, 447 
at 10-11, cited in Biukovic, 2008, p.302 ftnt.125) was as much as the 
Commission was prepared to divulge at the time that the DCFR was in 
preparation. As Biukovic (ibid.) points out, the natural inference was that 
“no further explanation” would be forthcoming.  During the following year 
a proposed consolidated consumer contract law for the purpose of 
regulating on-line selling  -  a measure entirely consistent with the eight 
directives undergoing consolidation  -  was published in order to 
consolidate in a legislative instrument the ratio of judicial pronouncements 
over the previous two decades. The Commission, perhaps not wishing to be 
seen to detract from the preparation of the DCFR in its final stages, appears 
to have neglected the opportunity presented by the consolidation measure 
to advertise its merits to a wider audience. 
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The legal position under the treaties   
The institutions of the European Communities are bound to act within quite 
narrow parameters set down by Article 7 TFEU and Articles 13 and 21 
TEU for the realization of objectives “assigned” to the Community under 
the original treaty of accession.  Articles 114 and 115 TFEU provide for the 
enactment by the Council of directives intended to enhance the functioning 
of the internal market. This includes directives obliging the legislatures of 
member states to provide for the greater approximation of laws and of 
business practices:  by the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005 the 
Commission sought to achieve “fully harmonized standards of behaviour 
for businesses in making, performing and breaking (sic) their contracts 
with consumers”.  
 
The Court of Justice’s role 
Article 263 TFEU implicitly precludes the Court of Justice of the European 
Union from judicial activism in pursuit of its goal of uniformly interpreting 
in accordance with the so-called teleological principle the treaty of 
accession and the instruments of secondary legislation. In consequence, 
after half a century the results seem disappointing to those representatives 
of a European ‘legal science’, who wish to see a commitment to rapid 
progress replace the unsystematic approach to harmonization that results 
from reliance on the vagaries of European Community case law. As 
mentioned above, it is case law itself that has checked, at least temporarily, 
any ambition to employ a code, or other instrument capable of being 
enforced, in order to achieve the degree of harmonization that was 
envisaged in the 1950s.  The proposed CESL may be regarded as a means 
to avoid reversion to a merely sectoral approach to harmonization. 
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Impact of Tobacco case judgments 
Until the late 1990s no-one had tested the common assumption that legal 
diversity “causes transaction costs and lowers economic trade and welfare”. 
At the turn of the century, in its judgment in the first of the two Tobacco 
Advertising cases, the Court of Justice of the EU stressed that the mere fact 
that diverse mandatory laws exist and are regarded as posing an abstract or 
notional risk to the vitality of the internal market, does not of itself justify 
legislative intervention on the part of the European Community
43
. In other 
words there has to be a ‘real and present’ problem resulting in direct and 
measurable consequences  -  such as the persistence of an unacceptably 
high number of long-term unemployed throughout the Member States  -  
for such intervention to be justified. As a consequence of this, confirmed 
by a second Tobacco Advertising judgment subsequently, the Commission 
learnt that its activities must be limited to taking particular measures in 
response to specific problems or anomalies encountered from time to 
time
44
. The two judgments cast doubt on the question, at once academic 
and practical, whether the Council and Commission actually have the 
authority to adopt either a Code of Contract Law or a European Civil Code 
that would be applicable across the European Union.  
 
Conventions on Contractual and non-Contractual Obligations 
The Rome I Convention also presented the Commission with a legal 
challenge to its competence from an unexpected quarter. Art. 3 of the 
Convention states that the applicable contract law must be ‘the law of a 
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country’  -  as distinct from one of the academic exercises such as ‘the 
Principles of European Contract Law   -  which in turn raised the question 
whether national laws could in time be replaced by a Europe-wide code. In 
2008 the Rome Convention was replaced with the Rome I Regulation 
which seems to have been a device designed, in part at least, to leave open 
the possibility of imposing a European Contract Law Code at an 
unspecified date in the future
45
. As Biukovic (2008, p.308) surmised, Art 3 
would have to be redrafted if the Rome I Convention were to be adopted as 
a Regulation and this is indeed what happened.  It is not unreasonable to 
suppose that one reason why the Regulation was promulgated a generation 
after the Convention was negotiated was in order to accomplish this. The 
natural inference, it follows, is that the notion of a European Civil Code has 
not been abandoned, but is merely considered inexpedient at present
46
. If 
the Draft Common Frame of Reference evolved to become a fully fledged 
optional instrument it would be one more such “regime” in addition to 
those of the existing Member States. This might be one of the reasons, if 
not the sole reason, why the Commission has evinced a preference for a 
normative instrument. Should circumstances change and the Commission 
become more confident about its powers, the question of codification of the 
law of contract may be addressed with renewed vigour. This might happen 
if the proposed regulation for CESL is less effective than anticipated in 
achieving economic regeneration. 
 
The possibility had always existed that in view of Sweden’s traditionally 
much higher standard of consumer protection than is typical of other liberal 
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 February 2011 
expressed scepticism regarding the workability of anything more than an optional instrument. 
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democratic states, her admission to the European Union would usher in a 
period of enhanced consumer protection, and this has proved to be the case. 
Moreover, the inclusion, by Article 38, of consumer protection in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which, although 
generally regarded as ‘soft law’ (Costa, 2010), does form part of the Lisbon 
treaty, has given the EU’s Commissioner for Justice, currently Viviane 
Reding, an enhanced role in consumer affairs because the office includes 
the Fundamental Rights portfolio. The Commission’s initial failure to 
predict that there would be resistance in Sweden to the adoption of the 
policy of maximum harmonization played its part in formulating the 
concept of an optional instrument -  by which national rules which pre-
dated the harmonized ones could ‘perfectly co-exist’ (Gomez and Ganuza 
2011, p.9) with the latter  -  being seen as the more attractive. The resulting 
Common European Sales Law appears to be likely to supplant the DCFR as 
the main vehicle for developing a corpus of distinctly European contract 
terms. However, the potential for the Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods to form the basis for B2B transactions remains a theoretical 
possibility (Clive 2011, para.9).  
 
It is likely that the Commission’s policy in respect of the European 
consumer was a by-product of its attempts to achieve “the very best 
balance between opportunities for businesses and consumers, for legal 
certainty and the necessary flexibility” (Reding 2012, para.31) since the 
CESL offers “comparable or higher level of protection than most national 
laws” (ibid., para.26) to the consumer. Although Reding’s language 
appears both optimistic and objective, in reality such expressions as “the 
very best level” and “comparable or higher” have the capacity to have a 
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negative impact on legal certainty. Whether consumers in Scandinavian 
countries will accept the ‘comparable’ level of consumer protection offered 
by the establishment of a supposedly optimal level of consumer protection 
remains to be seen. In the mean time the Commission stresses the positive, 
arguing that those who do business under the CESL will gain a competitive 
advantage, the Commission’s aim being to “make sure that the Common 
European Sales Law will develop into a trademark of our internal market” 
(ibid., para.28). It remains the case, however, that, according to a Which? 
report (Lyttle 2011, p.2), as many as 62 percent of those respondents who 
had never entered into a cross-border transaction cited apprehension about 
obtaining either replacement goods or repayment of the price in the event 
of goods found to be damaged or defective on arrival as their principal 
reason.  The fact that the support of consumer groups for the proposed 
CESL is lukewarm at best reflects the lack of consultation with them prior 
to drafting.  
 
Supplanting the Draft Common Frame of Reference 
One of the virtues of a parallel optional law regime is that barriers to cross 
border trade created by differences in law, custom and language can be 
lowered without unduly disturbing the provision for national contract law.  
It is the ‘barrier’ represented by differences in law that is most often 
singled out for comment. For instance the following assertion was made by 
Turini and van Ypersele who were cited in the Commission’s Proposal for 
the CESL in 2010:  
legal complexity is higher when trading with a country whose legal system is 
fundamentally different while it has been demonstrated empirically that bilateral 
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trade between countries which have a legal system based on a common origin is 
much higher than trade between two countries without this commonality
47
. 
While this observation may be true as a general statement it is submitted 
that it is potentially misleading in a European context where in reality the 
legal systems are not ‘fundamentally’ different. Moreover, given that the 
contract law of most member states is based on the Civil Law the second 
assertion would appear to imply that the proposed regulation for a CESL is 
actually superfluous.  
 
The number of obstacles to increased economic activity in the European 
community, it is often argued, is of itself no reason for failing to take action 
where measurable progress can be made. Since May 1989, when the 
codification of private law was first urged by the European Parliament, two 
resolutions have urged that the progressive harmonization of certain 
aspects of private law is essential to the completion of the internal market. 
This according to Smits (1998, p.331), rendered what had hitherto been an 
academic debate among jurists “a hot political item”. When the 
Commission’s Green Paper was published in July 2010 the Commission 
maintained that because contract law remained in a ‘fragmented’ state 
across the European Community, legal uncertainty for those engaged in 
commerce was thereby increased and consumer confidence declined 
correspondingly. The references to European contract law being 
‘fragmented’ indicates that the thinking of staff in the Commission has 
been strongly influenced by the arguments and terminology of leading 
academic proponents of a European Civil Code. The policy options upon 
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which stakeholders were consulted according to the terms of the 
Commission’s Green Paper ranged from a set of non-binding contract rules 
through to harmonization of national contract laws by means of a 
Regulation, or their replacement with a European code. Ms Reding was 
quoted in the Green Paper (EC, Commission 2010).as arguing that the 
international financial crisis provided an ‘historic opportunity’ to make a 
‘quantum leap towards a more European contract law.’  
 
The Common European Sales Law   
 In May 2010 an expert group had been convened whose brief was  - 
to transform the so-called Draft Common Frame of Reference ... into a simple, 
user-friendly, workable solution adapted to the needs of consumers and the 
reality of the business environment.(ibid.) 
One senses here an underlying note of frustration at the inability during the 
previous two decades of European legal scholars to produce anything 
conforming to this description. 
 
The outcome of the consultation led to the publication of a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales 
Law in October 2011. This document is concerned to demonstrate that the 
consumer should ‘suffer no deprivation’ of his customary protection. The 
Common European Sales Law (CESL) is defined as ‘a parallel contract law 
regime’, one which if chosen by the parties supersedes national law. Its 
legal basis is defined as Art 114 of TFEU (formerly Art. 3h of the Treaty of 
Rome); in terms of proportionality and subsidiarity, it is defined by Art 5 of 
the Treaty of European Union (TEU) agreed at Maastricht. The reasons 
given for deciding on a Regulation on an option were, firstly, the 
inadequacy of ‘a non-binding instrument such as a toolbox’ under the CFR 
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to achieve the desired objective and, secondly, to have replaced national 
laws with ‘a non-optional European contract law’ might have entailed 
significantly increased costs for those ‘domestic traders’ not wishing to 
engage in cross-border commerce. The latter reflects the kind of political 
considerations that have to be weighed at the stage when policy is being 
formulated. 
 
The purpose of the CESL was summarized by Whittaker (2012, p.587): 
“The economic objectives … rest on the possibility of a trader to do 
business cross-border on a single, uniform legal basis and therefore a single 
set of standard terms.” From the point of view of the Commission the 
CESL has additional virtues. Firstly, it avoids the element of national 
diversity inherent in a policy of minimum harmonization of consumer 
protection; secondly, it is based on the principle of agreement between the 
parties (ibid., p.583); lastly, it is considered a proportionate response to the 
obstacles to economic growth usually attributed to the existence of internal 
borders and differing legal traditions.  
 
For certain legal scholars, notably in Germany, the implied criticism of a 
European Civil Code, namely that the means were not directly 
proportionate to the ends to be achieved, calls into question the decades of 
work invested in trying to establish a European rather than national ‘legal 
science’. For Eidenmüller et al (2012), the CESL is over-prescriptive. The 
extensive duties of disclosure on the part of the seller, together with the 
formality surrounding the consumer’s rights of withdrawal, receive 
especial criticism. Much of this seems to be doctrinal in nature, as much as 
to say that fewer standard terms under the Acquis communautaire should 
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be included automatically. Moreover concerns about the quality of 
consumer protection are not eliminated on account of the optional nature of 
the instrument (Lyttle 2011, p.8)
48
.  Eidenmüller et al (op. cit.) go on to 
express concern that in spite of these imperfections the CESL might 
ultimately prove a success and that to forestall this eventuality it should be 
abrogated before it takes effect. They argue that what is needed is further 
debate on the extent and nature of contract law harmonization in Europe, 
rather than the speedy legislative enactment of a flawed product.  
 
The concerns expressed are not simply those of perfectionists but rather 
reflect the implicit recognition that the promulgation of the CESL is a 
potentially mortal threat to the eventual realization of a European Civil 
Code. As discussed in Chapter 1, two of Eidenmüller’s co-authors, Jansen 
and Zimmermann, had cast doubt on the notion that the DCFR had 
constituted a ‘roadmap’ for the approximation of contract law in Europe, 
whereas Schulte-Nölke (2007) had been more favourably disposed. 
Schulte-Nölke’s attitude can be traced to the pioneering work he had 
undertaken on the concept of the ‘Blue Button’ which lies at the heart of 
the CESL. Notwithstanding the consumer protection principles enshrined 
within the CESL by virtue of Art 114 TFEU, and the passing on of the 
concomitant costs to the European consumer or SME, the possibility 
remains, as Eidenmüller et al fear, that if enough buyers do ‘press the Blue 
Button’ the CESL will represent European standard contract terms for 
many years.  
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It is important to recognize that the CESL is not envisaged as a so-called 
“twenty-eighth national jurisdiction” but as a second contract law regime 
within each of the Member States. It is intended that the parties agree 
which domestic law should govern the agreement according to the existing 
principles under the Rome I Convention and then proceed to elect to use 
the CESL if they so agree. This two-stage test, necessitated by the the 
pegging of the CESL to the provisions of both the Rome I and Rome II 
Conventions in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, appears at first sight cumbersome and Whittaker devotes much 
of his review of the CESL to the consideration of the operation of the 
default rules in the event that the parties agree to use the CESL but neglect 
to undertake the first step in the process described above. It is submitted, 
however, that while it may take time for the parties to become accustomed 
to the new arrangements, the use of the CESL should become relatively 
problem free in the longer term. Moreover, it is likely that in terms of 
business to business transactions under the CESL both prospective parties 
would seek legal advice before using the provisions for the first time. The 
benefits would accrue through building up a longer-term business 
relationship. 
 
The duty of disclosure to the Consumer 
Greater difficulty is likely to be encountered in business to consumer 
transactions because of the extensive pre-contractual duties of disclosure 
imposed on the trader. Here the ambit of good faith and fair dealing come 
to the fore. The question arises as to whether the trader in a contemplated 
business to consumer transaction is obliged  -  and if so to what extent  -   
to advise the consumer that, by opting to do business on ‘European terms’, 
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he or she may surrender a higher level of consumer protection that 
otherwise would be available by virtue of Art 6(2) of the Rome I 
Regulation, since this information is not included in the Standard 
Information Notice provided for by those who drafted the CESL. 
Accordingly the principle of good faith and fair dealing operates in such a 
way as to increase legal uncertainty and to place the responsibility for 
disclosure on to the enterprise whose activities the CESL is intended to 
foster. Whittaker (2012, p.600) detects a further paradox: the cost-saving 
benefit to traders will be undermined if, as a result of their disclosure of the 
potential loss of protection to consumers, some consumers elect to do 
business only within the terms of domestic legislation while others are 
content, in the words of the Recitals, to ‘make a conscious choice’ by 
clicking on ‘the blue button’ and proceed with the transaction on the basis 
of the CESL. 
 
The argument that the CESL unnecessarily presents another layer of 
complexity appears not to take into account that such a Sales Law would be 
subject to litigation across the European Union. Cases representing a body 
of precedents would soon develop which taken together with the 
interpretation of the CESL itself would constitute a ‘toolbox’ for keeping 
the working of the CESL under review. A successful CESL would 
probably make a Common Frame of Reference redundant in terms of 
business to consumer contracts. There is no suggestion that the proposed 
CESL should supplant CISG altogether and it is likely that the latter is 
intended to remain the standard ‘default terms’ in ‘business-to-business’ 
contracts.   
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Trader to trader transactions 
It is unclear how significant in economic terms cross-border business to 
consumer transactions really are, although it seems likely that a marked 
increase in volume of such trade would enhance a spirit of ‘European-ness’ 
among citizens. In the case of business to business contracts where neither 
party is a SME, the exclusion of the operation of the principle of good faith 
by mutual consent may be possible under article 8(3) of the Proposal, 
according to Whittaker (op. cit., p.598.). While such a course of action may 
prove feasible it is intended that the CESL should be adopted in its entirety 
or not at all. We can be sure that traders based outside the EU, who 
primarily do business in a limited number of Member States with whose 
legal systems they are acquainted, are looking favourably at the Proposal. It 
would be surprising if the usual benefits of increased economic activity do 
not manifest themselves in the future if there is widespread use of the 
CESL across the EU. If increased volumes of trade encourage healthy 
competition the principal beneficiary will be the consumer. A standard set 
of European terms ought over time to stimulate increased volumes of trade 
with those countries whose contract law is ‘fundamentally different’ from 
the Civil or Common Law systems. European businessmen negotiating 
agreements beyond the EU may get better terms under the CESL than they 
do where contracts have to be negotiated separately and the advantage lies 
with the party in whose territory the contract is made. While these 
considerations are admittedly conjectural, it may be observed that the likely 
benefits outlined here form no part of the Commission’s reasoning for 
wishing to introduce the CESL. The inference that naturally arises from 
this omission is that the proposed CESL is in reality the end product, 
provisionally at least, of the two decade long Project for a European Civil 
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Code. Corroboration for this may be found in the habitual patterns of 
thought that are revealed in the recitals and articles.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
For the foreseeable future the European Commission can be expected to 
continue devising policies which produce measurable economic benefits 
for consumers while continuing to engage in the debate regarding what 
form of closer integration in the EU is desirable. The notion of what 
Helmut Kohl liked to call a “Common European Home” remains viable 
and lies at the heart of much of the deliberation that takes place in the 
Commission. However, if political unification remains the ultimate goal, 
Commission staff have been noticeably reticent about matters of detail. 
Greater frankness in the preparation of both the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference and the Common European Sales Law would have gone far 
towards allaying suspicions that the Commission had a hidden agenda in 
these areas. The fact that Staudenmayer (2006, p.237) felt the need to deny 
the existence of such an agenda indicates that a considerable degree of 
mistrust had been allowed to build up in the eight years since the Study 
Group for a European Civil Code had been instituted.  
 
Completing the approximation of the Common Law to the Civil Law 
tradition in a relatively short space of time seems to have been regarded as 
simply a matter of political will. However, a generation ago Fletcher 
(1982) advocated  
an attitude of permanently raised consciousness among the participants of the 
European  -  and indeed in any other regionally-based  -  programme of legal 
integration so that they maintain a sensitivity to the external implications of 
developments taking place internally within the organization or Community to 
which they belong, and furthermore make every effort to create and encourage, 
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rather than suppress or discourage, opportunities for progress towards inter-
regional legal harmony.” (op. cit., pp.4-5) 
 
This opinion of this Common Law practitioner does not contradict remarks 
made a decade later by Edward (1994, p.264), a Scottish judge who sat in 
the European Court of Justice. He described the experiences of English 
lawyers during the years immediately following the United Kingdom’s 
accession to the European Community in terms of “exasperation” for those 
of both the Civil Law and Common Law traditions. However, the fact that 
English law concerns itself with facts more than principles meant that 
practitioners from both traditions were not slow to realize that successful 
harmonization would depend not on abstractions but on “what exists on the 
ground” (ibid., p.264). He continued -  
The search is for solutions that offer compatibility rather than uniformity of 
laws. The search for common ground between diverse legal systems is unlikely 
on the whole to home in on the distinctive doctrinal solution of one or other of 
the major systems. The chosen solution is more likely to be eclectic or 
‘homegrown European’. 
 
The fact that two jurists from different, some would say rival, legal 
traditions within the United Kingdom can quite independently reach similar 
conclusions must be accounted for by reason of their lack of concern either 
for economic considerations or for driving forward ‘ever closer’ European 
integration. By contrast, as the speeches of Viviane Reding plainly reveal, 
the view that considerably enhanced consumer confidence will yield 
measurable economic benefits continues to be the principal motivating 
factor among those in the Commission most concerned with pressing 
simultaneously for greater political integration in the European Union, and 
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greater convergence of Contract Law. Many would argue that it is naïve to 
suggest that through the approximation of laws alone the EU can enter a 
period of vibrant economic growth in a non-inflationary consistently 
expanding economy. To some extent the Commission has become a 
prisoner of its own rhetoric: issues of legal principle have become 
separable only with difficulty from broader policy considerations in which 
the economic performance of the EU remain paramount. A contributory 
reason for this may be that those who founded the European Communities 
closely identified the question of the “accelerated raising of the standard of 
living” under Art. 2 of the Treaty of Rome 1957 with their wider political 
vision. 
 
Confidence in obtaining justice in any but the consumer’s home 
jurisdiction is likely to remain low for the time being. Not least among non-
tariff barriers to increased cross-border trade are the different conventions 
and rules relating to the discovery of documents during litigation. For the 
lawyer as much as for the consumer such divergence will be considered an 
additional bar to that posed by language differences. All such differences in 
legal culture reflect differences in outlook (mentalité) in relation to the 
assumptions which lie at the heart of that culture. In the absence of the 
removal of these and other non-tariff barriers the desired economic benefits 
of the Common European Sales Law may well be modest.  Biukovic (2008, 
p.313) points out that the Commission embarked on a policy of supporting 
“further economic integration of national markets” without clarifying the 
question of “whether diversity in laws is an actual obstacle” to the 
functioning of an integrated market. The fact that a consolidated consumer 
contract law was proposed by the Commission less than a year after the 
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publication of the DCFR, in October 2008, lends support to this contention.  
Biukovic’s remarks appear to be oblique criticism of those who nominated 
the authors of the PECL and, subsequently, appointed the Study Group for 
a European Civil Code. 
 
The Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum on the CESL (COM 2011: 
635) concentrated on traditional concerns over lost cross-border trade 
worth “tens of billions” of Euros annually “due to differences in contract 
law” resulting from “fragmented” (so-called) legal systems.  One virtue of 
Schulte-Nölke’s ‘Blue Button’ is that it is orientated towards trading 
partners in a globalized market. The prospect of doing business on 
European standard terms has met a favourable reception overseas even if in 
North America it is regarded as undermining the principle of freedom of 
contract (Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 2012 p.20-21). Paradoxically the 
principal benefits that the EU is likely to receive are increased volumes of 
trade with countries beyond its borders as distinct from the ones that it was 
looking for in terms of increased cross-border trade among the member 
states. Although evidence is only anecdotal, it seems that a greater degree 
of confidence can also be expected on the part of European sellers to 
countries whose business mores have traditionally created uncertainty 
about contractual obligations being honoured.  
 
The manner in which harmonization was approached by the Commission 
during the 1990s suggests that the issue was one of adaptation by 
jurisdictions that do not share the Civil Law tradition.  This has been amply 
illustrated by the decision to include good faith and fair dealing in the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1993 in spite of the fact 
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that the doctrine was not universally recognized among EU member states.  
Evidently there were political considerations taken into account in 
initiating a policy decision which pre-empted the larger question of 
whether the harmonization of Contract Law among the Member States 
could be brought about either by the Common Law jurisdictions choosing 
to adopt Civil Law standards, or by developing compatible doctrines of 
their own. In order for the UTCC Regulations 1993, 1999 to be applied 
consistently across the Member States of the EU there would have to be an 
agreed standard of what duties are imposed on contracting parties. 
Accordingly, the Court of Justice was left in an invidious position by those 
who drew up the regulations. 
 
Risk of legal nationalism  
Among European legal scholars, advocates of the ‘defragmentation’ of the 
law of obligations have not been punctilious in differentiating the 
harmonization of the essential principles of European law from a policy 
promoting the homogenization of European law according to Civil Law 
principles. Implicitly the continued existence of the Common Law as a 
learned tradition in its own right has been called into question.  Had the 
trend that was decisively rejected by the Commission in 2003 been allowed 
to continue the Common Law might have come to be regarded by future 
generations of English, as well as European, jurists as simply an aberration 
from the dominant Continental tradition which lasted only as long as 
English history developed differently from that of her European 
neighbours. One senses that the narrower vision and closer horizons of the 
technocrat have predominated during the last decade. Fletcher (1982, p.10) 
pointed out that the Commission’s programme of political integration, 
while not authorized by the Treaties was ‘implicitly sanctioned’ as being 
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necessary to the realization of the EU’s objectives. He argued (ibid., p.11) 
that if policy makers and European jurists combined for the express 
purpose of “progressively weakening the identity and powers of the State” 
by attacking “the traditional nexus between individual State autonomy and 
a distinct and in many ways idiosyncratic legal system belonging to that 
State” and in so doing strengthened the identity and powers of the 
European institutions, increased levels of legal nationalism would result.  
Such an easily predictable phenomenon would inevitably render the 
realization of a ‘Europeanized’ private law a distant prospect.  
 
Underlying the debate about the speed and goals of harmonization in the 
late 1990s there remains an unresolved tension between the adherents of an 
essentially rationalist approach to law-making and those who see law as 
evolutionary, reflecting back the prevailing mores and values of the 
citizenry to the society it serves. If this tension  -  which is intimately 
connected with the ‘epistemological chasm’ to which Legrand referred  -  
proves ultimately irresolvable, nations must learn to respect each other’s 
characteristic differences and pursue a policy of approximation based on 
the practical application of the principles of justice, as advocated by 
Edward (above, p.120). If European companies make use of the 
harmonized ‘European Standard Terms’ represented by the CESL in cross 
border transactions, or in dealings with the European Union’s near 
neighbours, an authentically European ‘legal scholarship’ will eventually 
coalesce around the interpretation placed on the instrument by 
practitioners. It seems desirable that this should be permitted to develop 
organically, that is according to the existing standards in ‘the Community’  
-  albeit one comprising some four hundred million people. If, on the other 
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hand, short term considerations lead to harmonization on the basis of Civil 
Law principles alone, the result will be essentially as Modernist in spirit as 
the Code Civil of 1804. It would be difficult to construe anything of the 
kind as constituting significant progress. In short, lasting harmonization of 
European contract law will only be accomplished when a European ‘legal 
scholarship’ is established by disinterested comparative lawyers who, like 
Friedrich von Savigny before them, do not have as their ultimate aim the 
promulgation of a Civil Code. 
 
Conflict resolution through education 
The ideological division between the Natural Law and Historical Schools 
of jurisprudence was more apparent in the 19
th
 Century, especially in 
Germany, than it has been since 1900 when the BGB took effect and the 
codifiers in that country finally prevailed. During the last century 
Savigny’s many admirers, unaware of the disdain that Savigny himself 
evinced for codification, have recognized in the BGB a distillation of the 
Rechtswissenschaft advocated by their most celebrated jurist. It must be 
recognized that this ‘legal scholarship’ was essentially Roman rather than 
German or ‘European’ in character. It is less clear what advocates of a 
‘Europeanized’ legal scholarship, such as Professors von Bar and 
Zimmermann, hoped to achieve in the decades either side of the 
millennium since both were, and remain, champions of a European Civil 
Code. It seems reasonable to infer that the legal scholarship that they 
contemplated was not an end in itself but simply a means to prepare the 
ground among European jurists for acceptance of such a code. It has been 
argued above that the historical examples and analogies adduced in favour 
of a ‘novum Ius commune Europaeum’ by these two legal scholars, among 
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others, are flawed. It has been argued, too, that much of the terminology, 
such as ‘defragmentation’ and even the word ‘harmonization’ itself, which 
has been employed by modern legal scholars in place ‘approximation’ is 
probably tendentious. Two negative consequences have followed. Firstly, 
for three decades unsound scholarship was offered as a basis for 
constructing a Europe-wide Law of Obligations intended to make 
redundant well-established national traditions. Secondly, this same 
unsound scholarship has been taken at face value by those in the 
Commission of the European Union responsible for directing policy. This 
may be readily inferred from the vocabulary used in a number of public 
references on the part of the Commissioner for Justice, cited in the Chapter 
Five above, particularly with reference to ‘fragmented’ legal systems. It is 
no exaggeration to state, therefore, that it was the unqualified acceptance of 
less than rigorous scholarship on the part of the Commission a decade ago 
that was indirectly responsible for the sudden and drastic reassessment of 
its policy priorities in which it was obliged to engage, for had caution been 
exercised earlier a more nuanced policy would almost certainly have been 
developed. It seems inconceivable that the role of the academic lawyer 
from the Civil Law tradition in the formulation of policy in the European 
Union will be as prominent in the foreseeable future as it was in the decade 
after 1989. 
 
Ever since the judgments of the Court of Justice in the Tobacco Advertising 
cases early in the new millennium, talk of a European Civil Code, or of the 
codification of Contract Law, has been more in the nature of an aspiration 
than an achievable goal. To the advocates of one or other of these codes an 
optional instrument, such as the DFCR or the CESL, must appear as no 
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more than a pale imitation. It is likely that the ambition to create a code to 
serve the populations of an enlarged European Union, and thus give it 
greater cohesion, has only been deferred
49
. The point about cohesion is 
important. If presented as a ‘tidying up’ exercise for the purpose of 
consolidation, a proposal for codification has much to recommend it  -  not 
least to the pragmatist. However, anyone would be naïve to believe that, 
without reference to longer term political ambitions which have always 
tended to be integrationist in character, codification on a Europe-wide basis 
was either a matter of enhancing legal certainty in certain defined areas or 
simply a mechanism to stimulate economic activity.  
 
The likelihood of increased legal nationalism resulting from a successful 
drive to establish a code of ‘Europeanized’ contract law has been 
mentioned. It is submitted that such a codification could only be 
promulgated successfully among countries which had already codified their 
systems and which were willing to put the ideal of greater European 
cohesion ahead of national policy considerations. It is in theory possible 
that at a future date a majority of member states with Civil Law legal 
systems might attempt to override the objections of those countries which 
traditionally have followed the Common Law. Any attempt to impose such 
a code by the fiat of the Council of Ministers or the Commission would be 
widely regarded as an unwarranted imposition. This would not be the first 
time in European history that such an eventuality had come to pass. It has 
also been mentioned that the so-called ‘Reception’ of Roman law in 
                                                 
49
 On February 7
th
 2011 Diana Wallis MEP, the then rapporteur on the harmonization of the law of 
contract for the European Parliament, gave an illuminating, if disingenuous, answer to a question at the 
BIICL conference on this subject:  asked whether a European Civil Code was ‘now a dead letter’, she 
replied that such a code had ‘never been a live letter’, before going on to say that she considered that it 
would take at least a generation to achieve. 
130 
 
Germany from the late 15
th
 Century onwards was at times bitterly opposed. 
The majority of German academic lawyers today, having the benefit of 
hindsight, argue that the benefits of doing away with regional legal systems 
based on custom law render any legitimate grievance thereby caused 
regrettable but necessary for the greater good. It is submitted that in a 
Europe in which government rests on popular consent the proper way to 
harmonize private law is by engaging, not ignoring, public opinion. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 (above, p.9) the first modern advocate of a new 
Ius commune Europaeum, Helmut Coing, was also a keen advocate of 
Comparative Law as a means of developing a European dimension to legal 
education supported by scholarships and increased attendance by law 
students at universities outside their home countries (Coing, 1990) 
50
. It is 
submitted that a foundation for a ‘Europeanized’ contract law, of the kind 
envisaged by Edward and Fletcher (above, p.119) might ultimately be 
achievable by this means. Such a foundation would be more durable than 
one justified according to the selective use of historical precedents of the 
kind employed by Coing and subsequently by his uncritical admirers 
(above, p.37f.). Increased sharing of knowledge among European students 
and legal scholars would also seem preferable to the embarkation by the 
European Commission on the renewal of a policy which ultimately requires 
the use of a dirigiste measure such as regulation or directive in order to 
achieve its end.  No doubt such an end is as honestly as it is devoutly 
desired by its advocates, but many of the implications of its 
implementation, as well as the pitfalls, remain but dimly perceived. 
 
                                                 
50
 See Gordley, J. (2000-01) ‘Comparative Law and Legal Education’ 75 (4) Tulane Law Review 1003-
1014, p.1005 
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